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The topic of this dissertation is cost-containment measures in health care and their
eects on various aspects of a patient's behavior. The dissertation consists of three
chapters.
In the rst chapter I assess the ability of gatekeeping restrictions within insurance
plans to control the utilization of medical care through their inuence on the choice of
the initial provider. Empirical results are based on individual-level utilization panel data
from the 2001-2006 US Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. I nd only small dierences
between the types of initial provider chosen by individuals enrolled in gatekeeping and
non-gatekeeping plans. Further, within gatekeeping plans, 21 percent of patients self-refer
to specialists. Taken together, these ndings imply that the intended cost-containment
of gatekeeping - restriction of the utilization of specialist care - is surprisingly weak.
The second and third chapters make use of a unique natural experiment - a policy
change that implemented patient cost-sharing in the Czech Republic starting in 2008. In
the second chapter, my coauthor and I investigate the eects of the introduction of lump
sum copayments on the utilization of prescription drugs by elderly patients. We nd
that after the introduction of copayments the number of prescriptions lled decreased by
29%. At the same time, however, total expenditures on prescription drugs dropped only
in the rst quarter of the postintroduction period and then returned to previous levels.
This was partially due to behavioral responses of patients and physicians: a strategic
shift of prescription purchases to the time immediately before the introduction of the
reform, prescribing more packages on one prescription and an upward shift in the price
composition of prescribed drugs.
In the third chapter, we complement the analysis by looking at the eects of the partial
reversal of this policy, when regional governing bodies started to reimburse copayments
for prescription drugs in the selected (region-owned) pharmacies. Using matched indi-
vidual level data on the location of visits and prescription llings, we analyzed how the
variation in the prescription drugs' prices implied by copayment aected an individual's
choice of pharmacy. Using both non-parametric and parametric estimation techniques,
we nd a signicant shift in patients' preferences towards reimbursing pharmacies. We
also identied main drivers of the shift which include monetary cost (proxied by number










We assess the ability of health insurance plans with gatekeeping restrictions to control
the utilization of medical care through their inuence on the choice of the initial provider.
Empirical results are based on the individual-level utilization panel data from the 2001-
2006 U.S. Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. We nd only small dierences between
the initial provider chosen by individuals enrolled in gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping
plans. This, together with the fact that within gatekeeping plans, 21 percent of patients
self-refer to specialists, implies that the intended cost-containment eect of gatekeeping
- restricting the utilization of specialty care - is surprisingly weak.
†The author would like to thank Randall K. Filer, Partha Deb, Michael Grossman, Jan Hanousek,
Ted Joyce and Frantisek Kopriva for helpful comments. The views expressed are those of the author and
do not necessarily reect the position of any of the aliated institutions.
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1.1 Introduction and motivation
Many health insurance companies in the US try to contain costs by inuencing the
behavior of enrollees as to the specics of how they demand medical care. This linking of
health insurance with medical care provision frequently takes the form of managed care,
and is implemented as a complex set of requirements and incentives for both patients
and physicians. One rarely challenged cornerstone of managed care is gatekeeping - the
requirement that a primary care physician (PCP)1 coordinates a patient's treatment and
provides referrals to specialists, hospitals or other medical care. The intended purpose of
gatekeeping is to ration access to more costly specialty care to patients who really need
it, and to maintain treatment of less severely ill patients with the less costly PCP. In this
paper, we use panel data to evaluate whether gatekeeping actually works as intended and
to shed some light on patterns of subsequent care by examining patient and physician
behavior in gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping situations.
As health care costs continue to escalate, it has become progressively more imperative
for health insurance companies to nd eective ways to control costs while not signi-
cantly degrading patient outcomes. To this end, a large body of empirical literature has
attempted to quantify the eects of managed care (Miller and Luft 1997; Miller and Luft
2002; Garrido, Zentner, and Busse 2011) and, more specically, gatekeeping (Pati et al.
2005; Deb and Trivedi 2009) on medical care utilization. The results so far have been
inconclusive.
This lack of conclusive ndings arises from two methodological problems, both of
which this paper addresses. First, previous work routinely uses aggregate data on total
utilization of medical care in a given time period. Looking at the end point, i.e., total
use, of an often multi-layered care process tells us little about the eect of gatekeeping,
which by design should manifest itself most strongly at the beginning, by inuencing
which practitioner the patient chooses as their initial contact provider (ICP).2 Second,
previous studies fail to address the problem of self-selection, i.e., the fact that enrollees
who prefer direct access to specialty care because of their anticipated health care needs
should prefer to opt for plans without gatekeeping restrictions.
To address the end point/aggregate data issue, we use detailed, individual-level panel
1By primary care physician we mean family doctors and general practitioners, who provide primary
care services for patients in both gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping programs.
2Initial contact provider categories as dened in this paper are: PCP, specialist, non-MD, hospital,
and emergency room (ER).
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data from the 2001-2006 U.S. Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, in which we can distin-
guish not only each episode of illness, but within a given episode, the pattern of initial
and subsequent provider contact. To our knowledge, use of this design is unique in the
literature. To deal with the self-selection problem, we take advantage of a quasi-natural
experiment within our data by identifying the impact of gatekeeping in a sub-sample of
respondents whose enrollment choice between gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping insurance
plans was driven by factors external to their health care demand - the choice of insurance
plans provided by their employer.
Our main nding is intuitively surprising and has profound implications for health
insurance design. Contrary to previous studies, we nd no economically signicant dif-
ference between the initial contact provider (ICP) choices of individuals enrolled in gate-
keeping versus non-gatekeeping plans. Even though one would predict fewer self-referrals
to specialists (and a consequent higher number of PCP visits for patients in gatekeeping)
our results show only slight dierences, which are partially explained by self-selection.
Therefore, we conclude that gatekeeping does not eectively inuence patient behavior
through its presumed main operating channel, i.e., restricting direct access to specialty
care. The implication of these ndings for the insurance industry is that gatekeeping has
minimal impact on health care costs.
While the above nding is provocative, it is not the entire gatekeeping story. What if
gatekeeping via other mechanisms, such as patient and physician incentives, inuences the
specics of whether a patient utilizes primary care or the broad spectrum of specialist care
accessible after the ICP? We address this issue by analyzing patterns of medical care after
initial contact for both gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping plans. We nd that contact with
dierent types of ICP imply distinctly dierent patterns of future care (e.g. utilization
rates after an initial hospitalization are much higher than after an initial contact with
a PCP). However, conditional on the same type of ICP, we nd no dierences between
the utilization measures of gatekeeper versus non-gatekeeper patients, with the following
important exception. Gatekeeper patients are 25 percent more likely to be referred by
their PCP to a specialist than non-gatekeeper patients who use a PCP as an ICP. This
result continues to support the main nding that gatekeeping does not reduce specialty
care.
Following these hints of unexpected interactions within the gatekeeping model, we
delve further into the nuances of gatekeeping's impact on patient and physician behavior.
We analyze the eectiveness and appropriateness of referrals by PCPs as compared to
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self-referrals, with a focus on gatekeeping plans. We nd that PCP-referred patients more
severe illnesses (as proxied by the probability of further hospitalization) than self-referred
patients. Therefore, in keeping with expectations, it appears that within gatekeeping
plans, PCPs do retain the healthier patients, referring only the more severely ill patients
to specialty care. On the other hand, a sizeable 21 percent of patients with gatekeeping
do self-refer mainly for conditions that are recognizable and less severe, but still suitable
for specialty care even when they may must pay out of pocket. This eciency shift in
the composition of self- and PCP- referred patients within gatekeeping plans should be
taken into account by policy makers, especially when combining gatekeeping with referral
incentives for physicians.
1.2 Managed care, gatekeeping and health care utiliza-
tion
1.2.1 Theoretical approaches
The idea behind managed care (MC) is to design measures that aect the demand
and supply sides of health care systems in order to limit increasing medical care utiliza-
tion and, consequently, rising health care expenditures. If one aims to analyze how the
design of these measures specically aects the demand side, the key requirement is to
understand the decision-making process underlying the demand for health care at the
individual level. Two broad categories of models attempt to tackle this problem. One
line of reasoning, initiated by the Grossman (1972) seminal model views the demand for
health care solely as an outcome of the agent's own utility maximization, where health
enters the agent's utility as valuable capital, and demand for health care is derived the
same way as for any other investment. The other line of thought, represented by Zweifel
(1981),is a principal-agent approach, which assumes that demand for health care is de-
termined by the physician who, due to an informational advantage, acts as an eective
agent for a patient.
The model that best ts a general understanding of the decision-making process un-
derlying health care demand is a combination of the above approaches. Based on the
episodic model of care developed by Stoddart and Barer (1981) and applied by Pohlmeier
and Ulrich (1995) and Holmes and Deb (1998), one can model this process as having
two parts, with each part better explained by one of the models. In the rst stage, it is
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the patient who decides whether to visit a physician at all and, specically, what type
of provider he wants to contact rst. This decision can be satisfactorily captured by a
Grossman-type model because it is based on the patient's optimization with respect to
his budget constraints and supply-side restrictions. On the other hand, after rst con-
tact, the patient (for practical purposes) delegates decisions about the future course of
treatment to the physician, who then, in line with Zweifel's model, determines further
medical care utilization based on both clinical reasons and his own nancial incentives.3
Various mechanisms of managed care are targeted to aect both of these stages. This pa-
per focuses particularly on gatekeeping, which at the rst stage restricts provider choice,
and then aects the further course of treatment through referral policies.
The standard rationale for introducing gatekeeping into MC is based on moral hazard
in its standard interpretation by Arrow (1963) and Pauly (1968). According to moral
hazard theory, people with insurance (i.e. people who do not face the real price of the
provided health services at the time they use them) tend to demand more services than
they otherwise would without insurance. The gatekeeping role of the PCP in this context
would lie in rationing access to specialty care only to patients who need it to reduce
unnecessary medical interventions, thus controlling costs.
This cost-containment function of gatekeeping is one of two fundamental arguments
put forward by Scott (2000), the other being the informational advantage of the PCP
over the patient. Naturally, one would expect the PCP to be better informed about
the appropriate specialization of secondary care for a particular patient. On the other
hand, a PCPs actions in terms of diagnosis, treatment and/or referral strongly aect the
patient's welfare, but the patient is not fully aware of how much inuence the PCP has
or whether the PCP's action is appropriate in the particular situation. Therefore, the
value of gatekeeping depends on the validity of the assumption that primary care can
eectively substitute for more costly specialty and inpatient care.
From the theoretical point of view, however, the complexity of interaction between
primary and secondary care makes this assumption seem oversimplied. Fortney et al.
(2005) provide an overview of mechanisms that can lead to both substitutability and
complementarity of primary and secondary care. Primary care can be seen as a substitute
for secondary care if (1) it averts the need for specialist care by the prevention or early
detection of illness; (2) by managing chronic illnesses, it prevents their evolution into
more serious conditions treatable only at higher levels of expertise, or (3) by simply
3For empirical evidence see e.g. Campbell et al. (2007).
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restricting access through formal rules such as gatekeeping (Stareld 1994).4 On the other
hand, several possible mechanisms exist by which primary care acts as a complement to
secondary care: by using services that are ancillary to primary care (like laboratory
tests) or by detection of illnesses that must be treated through secondary care (like
cancer). Therefore, we cannot predict the overall eect of gatekeeping as a policy aimed
to increase use of primary care and we have to rely on analysis of real world examples to
provide comprehensive insights into interactions with other regulatory mechanisms and,
eventually, on eect on patient behavior.
1.2.2 Empirical ndings
This paper contributes to a broad class of empirical investigation on the eects of
managed care on utilization of medical services. Comprehensive reviews of this line of
research are provided in Glied (2000), Miller and Luft (1997), Miller and Luft (2002)
and recent results are summarized in Gaynor, Li, and Vogt (2007). As Glied points out,
however, the concept of managed care incorporates many dierent combinations of the
mechanisms used to manage health care provision and utilization. By using the broad
categorization health management organization (HMO) versus other health care plans,
many studies fail to take this aspect into account. So, it is not surprising that very
little evidence exists on specically how gate-keeping and corresponding provider access
restrictions aect medical care utilization. Also, the problem of self-selection into health
insurance plans is of great importance to this line of research. Naturally, people who prefer
unrestricted access to specialist care because of their anticipated health needs should opt
for plans without gatekeeping restrictions.5 Therefore, if the authors of a particular
study do not account for selection, they easily overestimate the eect of gatekeeping
by capturing the eect of unobserved characteristics of enrollees rather than that of
gatekeeping alone.
In the literature, researchers employ dierent techniques to deal with the problem
of selection into particular insurance types. First, they avoid the issue altogether by
taking advantage of various natural or randomized experiments and consecutive random
assignment of enrollees. Martin et al. (1989) use a randomized trial to determine the
4In their analysis of a mixed public-private health care system in Italy, Atella and Deb (2008) found
that PCP, public specialists, and private specialist are indeed substitute sources of care.
5Glied (2000) claims that the results of the studies on selection, e.g.Hellinger (1995) suggest that
managed care plans have 20-30 percent prior utilization advantage over indemnity plans.
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eectiveness of a gatekeeping plan that imposes cost-containment incentives both on
PCP (fundholding) and patient (100 percent copayment for self-referral), and nd that
it reduces the costs of ambulatory services by reducing specialist visits. For the second
widely used technique, instrumental variable estimation, nding variables that are both
good predictors of insurance choice and exogenous to further medical care utilization is
dicult. Moreover, although this approach works well when the outcomes of interest can
be modeled using linear regression methods, it is dicult to apply for utilization measures
because of their count data character.6
Another option is to use latent factor models that parametrically account for selec-
tion on unobservables and then estimate the model using simulation based methods.
This approach is taken in Deb and Trivedi (2009) and represents one of the few studies
specically examining the eect of gatekeeping and the physician network attributes of
the health insurance plans on health care utilization. The authors dene health insur-
ance plans as bundles of three possible restrictions: (1) providers' network; (2) sign-up
with PCPs, and; (3) out-of network costs coverage, and then estimate their eect on ve
fairly general measures of health care utilization. The study nds signicant evidence
of selection into managed care plans.7 The authors nd that if the plan requires a PCP
sign-up, individuals have more contacts with non-physician providers and also undergo
signicantly more surgeries and hospital stays, a nding that the authors explain by a
tendency of PCPs to diagnose new medical conditions requiring further treatment within
the procedure of routine examinations.
The second line of relevant research is literature on the channels through which gate-
keeping restrictions work. The rst channel is through imposing constraints and incen-
tives on physician referral behavior. Grembowski, Cook, and Patrick (1998) model the
expected inuence of managed care on physician referrals and health outcomes. Similarly
to the previously cited Fortney et al. (2005), they point out that by reducing or delaying
access to specialist services, MC can aect health outcomes in both positive and negative
ways.8 Forrest et al. (2002) present a descriptive overview of family physicians' referral
decisions nding that apart from clinical reasons, patient pressure is a common determi-
6See Mullahy (1997) for the nonlinear instrumental variable methods for count data models.
7In their complementary paper, Deb and Trivedi (2006) claim that this selection is based on socio-
economic observables rather than health status.
8On the one hand, most medical problems can be diagnosed and treated appropriately in primary
care (Donaldson et al. 1996). As more patients are allocated to PCPs to diagnose and treat, however,
this can result in worse health outcomes due to misdiagnosis, inappropriate delay of referrals, or simple
provision of lower quality of care than specialists would deliver (Kassirer 1994).
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nants. Further, in one-third of cases, the referral was made during encounters other than
oce visits, which clearly undermines the cost-containment function of gatekeeping.
The other aim of gatekeeping is to restrict the widespread practice of self-referral
as it has become a common route to specialty care. Analysis of the NAMCS survey of
oce-based physicians by Forrest and Reid (1997) found that 31 percent of specialists'
new patients were self-referred. In attempting to evaluate the appropriateness of these
self-referrals, the authors used hospitalization as a proxy for the severity of the illness
and found that self-referred patients have a lower probability of hospitalization than
patients referred by a physician, and therefore the appropriateness of self-referrals can
be questioned. On the other hand, studies in specialized health care elds point to a
positive eect of self-referral - see Swinkels et al. (2014) for the eects in physical therapy
or Pollack et al. (2015) for lung and colorectal cancer.
A theoretically important tool to discipline patient behavior in order to contain costs
is changing the out-of-pocket price of treatment, so that gatekeeping patients have higher
co-payments or must even bear the full cost of the medical procedure if they decide to
bypass the gatekeeper. Holmes and Deb (1998) examine the ways in which the costs of
nonresidential mental health care depend on the choice of the initial provider and the level
of cost sharing imposed on the patient. The results are consistent with an episodic model
of demand. The out-of-pocket price signicantly inuences the patient's choice of the
initial provider, but later utilization appears to be unrelated to the nancial incentives
that patients face. Pati et al. (2005) use MEPS data to look at the eect of managed care
gatekeeping on overall health care costs. They nd that mean per capita expenditures
were approximately 6 percent lower for gatekeeping patients compared to indemnity plan
patients, primarily due to lower out-of-pocket expenditures.
1.3 Methodology
We base our methodology on the episodic model of health care demand. We implement
it in three steps corresponding to the three main stages prior to and during a medical
care episode: choice of insurance plan, initial contact, and further course of treatment.
The main questions we address are: (1) Does gatekeeping aect the choice of the initial
contact provider? (2) Does this eect translate into further medical servicesutilization?
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1.3.1 Choice of insurance plan
Before the actual utilization, an individual decides whether and what kind of health
insurance to purchase. In the US, generally, one is eligible for a publicly provided insur-
ance (e.g. Medicare, Medicaid, or SCHIP); one can purchase private insurance through
one's employer, insurance group or on the individual market; or can remain uninsured.
In our study we focus on privately insured individuals, and analyze the impact of the
more subtle decision concerning plans one with and without gatekeeping restrictions.
People decide by comparing their insurance options with their needs, including ex-
pected health care utilization, and nancial constraints. While we do not model this
stage of decision-making explicitly, we are aware that expected health needs are a pos-
sible source of selection bias in our estimation, as people with higher expected needs
might be more willing to buy more generous coverage, which does not require a visit to
gatekeeper.
1.3.2 Choice of initial provider
When a person becomes ill and seeks medical help, he has to decide what type of physi-
cian or medical care provider to contact rst. This choice is inuenced by his personal
characteristics, previous experience (knowledge of doctors, expectations about quality of
treatment), subjective evaluation of the severity of the illness, and the conditions and
incentives embedded in his health insurance plan. This is also the stage of the patient's
decision-making intended to be inuenced by gatekeeping.
To quantify this inuence, a series of binomial logit models is estimated for ve
basic initial provider choices - primary care physician, specialist, non-medical personnel,
hospital and emergency care. We control for socio-demographic characteristics, employ-
ment characteristics, type of illness and, in particular, we introduce a dummy variable
indicating whether the insurance that person holds has a gatekeeping condition. To deal
with the endogeneity of gatekeeping status we estimate the model both on the full sample
and on the sub-sample of respondents who, due to supply restrictions, did not their in-
surance type themselves. They are thus subject to gatekeeping requirements that should
be unrelated to their individual preferences or expectations about their future health care
utilisation (see e.g. Martin et al. (1989)). In our analysis, we focus on a sub-sample of
covered respondents who were oered only one type of health insurance by their employer.
There are two implicit assumptions embedded in the application of this methodology.
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First, we assume that people do not choose their job based on the type of health insurance
it oers. There are apparent dierences in the characteristics of rms that oer none,
single, or a broader choice of health plans. Naturally, the question arises as to whether
dierent rms attract employees with varying health care preferences that will later trans-
late into dierent patterns of utilisation (we try to answer this question in the Results
section). Second, we assume that people generally prefer employer-provided insurance to
the outside option of purchasing individual coverage, and therefore, the restricted choice
is binding for them. This is true mainly due to nancial concerns, as in the US, employer
provided insurance is much cheaper than individual coverage. Our data indicates that
almost 90 percent of the respondents who were oered some plan through their employer
accepted it, and 95 percent of those who rejected an employer plan are dependents on a
family policy.
1.3.3 Further course of treatment
The episodic model of health care demand assumes that once the decision about the
rst point of contact has been made, a patient delegates most of his decision-making au-
thority over the further course of treatment to the initial contact provider. This provider
is then responsible for directing the patient through treatment either by directly pro-
viding care or through referrals. Nevertheless, a patient's characteristics still inuence
health outcomes because of their clinical importance or due to the patient's compliance
with treatment.
Therefore, we develop our analysis of the ICP choice by focusing on how this choice
aects the course of a patient's further treatment. The course of treatment is approxi-
mated using two measures - the probability of further encounters with dierent types of
providers within the episode of treatment (extensive margin) and the number of medical
care events within the episode of treatment by provider type(intensive margin). Con-
trol variables include socio-demographic characteristics, self-reported health status, and
dummy variables for the most prevalent health conditions.
In our simple empirical model of the determinants of medical care utilization, the
further course of treatment is assumed to depend on the actual choice of the initial
contact provider. We also include the interaction of this choice with the gatekeeping
restriction to separately estimate the utilization measures for patients with and without
gatekeeping restriction who initially choose the same type of provider. This way, we
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can identify whether any eect of gatekeeping stems from a source other than the initial
provider choice.
In general, both measures of health care utilization are modeled through a density
function f such as








iβ), k = 1, . . . , 5
where Yij denotes the utilization of services of provider type j(j = 1, . . . , 5) by individual
i; X i is the vector of independent explanatory variables; di is the binary indicator for
the gatekeeping status; and pik are dummy variables indicating whether the provider of
type k was the initial provider for individual i. The model of the probability of a further
encounter is then specied as a simple logit model, while the number of visits to a partic-
ular type of provider, recorded as a non-negative integer count, is specied as a negative
binomial-2 density to account for the excess number of zeros and over-dispersion.9 We es-
timate the model on both the full sample and sub-sample with exogenous enrollment into




Data for the episode-level analysis are derived from the Household Component of the
US Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) for 2001 to 2006 (Panels 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10).
These data are collected by the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality (AHRQ)
and the National Center for Health Statistics by drawing a sample of households that
participated in the previous year's National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) and then
applying an overlapping panel design with ve interviews occurring over a two-and-a-half
year period. The sample is representative of the American civilian, non-institutionalized
population with an oversampling of minorities.10
9Encounters with dierent types of medical care providers are not mutually exclusive nor are they
independent. A person with a severe condition would have a high probability of seeing more types
of medical care providers in the course of his treatment. Therefore, one can consider estimating the
equations for the utilization of dierent types of services as a system.
10For more information on MEPS survey design, see Cohen (1996), Cohen (1997b) and Cohen (1997a).
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MEPS data contain detailed information on medical expenditures and utilization,
demographic characteristics, employment characteristics, health insurance coverage, and
the health status of individuals. Moreover, MEPS groups medical care events (e.g. oce
visits, in-patient visits, or emergency room admissions) into episodes of care based on
self-reported medical conditions, which enables us to use the treatment episode as
the unit of analysis. Basically, we draw an individual and his characteristics from the
MEPS Full Year Consolidated Data File, connect him with all of his reported medical
conditions from MEPS Medical Conditions File, and get detailed information about all
the medical care events connected to these conditions from the series of MEPS Event
Files. By connecting the treatment to a particular condition we avoid the problem of
undetected multiple illness spells, which is the main pitfall of studies using aggregated
utilization measures.11 Also, we are able to detect the event that initiated the episode of
care (at least within the time scope of a survey), which is crucial for our analysis of ICP
choice.
In our analysis, we only consider medical care events identied as oce visits, outpa-
tient department visits, hospital inpatient stays, and emergency room visits.12 Further-
more, we restrict our analysis to the rst condition reported after June 1st of the rst
year of the panel survey (e.g. 2001 for respondents from Panel 6, 2002 for respondents
from Panel 7, etc.). The main reason is to avoid the problem of left-truncation. Since
we do not observe any condition-related event within the rst ve-month period, we can
assume that we have identied the true beginning of treatment and that the rst reported
event also represents the rst contact for that episode. By including only one episode of
treatment for each respondent, we ensure that observations are independent. This ap-
proach also has drawbacks, however. We discard patients who do not report any medical
care utilization, as well as those who were treated only within the rst ve months of the
survey. This strategy introduces a source of selection bias into data, the magnitude of
which will be discussed in the next sub-section. Also, the treatment episode might not
have concluded by the end of the survey.
11See Silva and Windmeijer (2001) for a detailed discussion of the problem of multiple illness spells.
12We thus discard dental visits and home health care, rst because dental coverage is usually separate
from general coverage and, second, because home health care applies to long-term and chronic conditions
that generally last more than 2 years.
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1.4.2 Sample construction
We focus on a sub-sample of non-elderly adults (ages 18-64) with private insurance
only who have responded in all ve interview rounds. The age restriction enables us to
avoid selection bias originating in dierent age-specic insurance coverage opportunities:
children are often covered by their parents' plans13, and the elderly above the age of 64
are eligible for the publicly funded Medicare program. Also, these three groups have
inherently dierent levels of medical utilization (unrelated to their specic insurance cov-
erage) with children and the elderly tending to have higher medical care utilization than
non-elderly adults. We further narrow the sample to employed (but not self-employed)
individuals for whom we have information about employer characteristics. After drop-
ping observations for which variables of interest were not dened, we are left with 18,809
individuals.
We then merge this sample with information about the rst condition reported after
June 1st, including the detailed characteristics of the ICP within this condition. This
strategy resulted in omission of 6,020 respondents who did not report any medical care
utilization (872 obs.), or for whom all episodes of medical care utilization began before
June 1st (5,148 obs.). Thus, the nal sample is 12,789 observations. Simple tabulation
reveals that in the sample of dropped observations, we observe a signicantly higher
proportion of people with gatekeeping requirements. These are not the people who report
no medical care utilization, however, as their distribution is the same across the two
insurance types. Instead, respondents with gatekeeping restrictions tend to have fewer
reported conditions in general and therefore a higher probability of reporting all medical
care in the rst ve months of the survey.
1.4.3 Denition of variables
Insurance plans with gatekeeping restrictions
MEPS identies the HMO and gatekeeper plans among privately covered individuals
by asking a series of questions about the characteristics of the plan. First, the person is
asked whether he is covered by an HMO. If the answer is negative, a follow-up question
determines whether the person is in a gatekeeping plan other than an HMO. Consistent
13Although young adults (students) are usually covered by their parents' insurance plans, they account
only for 2.3 percent of the sample without choice of insurance. Also, the age division is standard in the
literature.
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with prior studies (Pati et al. 2005), we then dene gatekeeping enrollees as those who
responded yes either to the rst or the second question. From our tabulations, 59
percent of the sample has insurance with gatekeeping restrictions and 41 percent of the
sample has insurance without gatekeeping restrictions. We use the answers provided in
the rst round to avoid the issue of the reverse causation, i.e., inuence of changed health
status on the choice of insurance.
Medical care utilisation
The particular focus of this paper is on the rst point of contact - i.e., the choice of ICP.
We divide medical care providers into ve categories  primary care physicians (PCP),
specialists (SPEC), non-physician medical personnel (nonMD), hospitals (HOSP), and
emergency rooms (ER). A physician was designated as a PCP if he or she was a general
or family practitioner or general internist.14 Any other medical eld was designated
as specialist. Under non-physician medical personnel we include chiropractor, nurse,
physician's assistant and other (undened) non-MD providers.
Table 1.1 presents a summary of utilization measures by gatekeeping status. First,
we present general summary measures of the number of conditions reported, as well
as total numbers of visits to a particular provider, all as a total over the two years of
the panel survey. In general, gatekeeping enrollees report fewer conditions and fewer
non-MD encounters. With respect to other types of medical care utilization, we do not
see a signicant dierence between gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping enrollees. We also
report what we refer to as health indicators, i.e. responses concerning the individual's
health status in the rst round of interviews, which could predict further medical care
utilization. We include dummies for good health15, for physical limitations and smoking,
and Body Mass Index (BMI). The comparison shows that a signicantly lower percentage
of gatekeeping respondents consider themselves to be healthy; other health indicators,
however, do not appear to be correlated with the gatekeeping status.
The second part of Table 1.1 describes utilization within the rst observed condition
after June 1st, in terms of the ICP chosen as well as a summary of further utilization
14Note that we did not include obstetricians/gynecologists in the category of PCP's but as specialists.
Even so, this denition tends to overestimate PCPs in the non-gatekeeping plan and therefore any
dierences in PCP use between the two plans would be underestimated.
15This dummy was derived from the self-reported perceived health status variable ascertained in the
rst interview round, where we designated respondents who answered excellent and very good as
healthy.
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measures. A summary of the rst encounter gives us the rst insight into the question:
How does the gatekeeping requirement aect the choice of the initial contact provider?
Simple tabulation suggests that gatekeeping enrollees have a signicantly higher proba-
bility of visiting a PCP and a lower probability of visiting a specialist as their rst point
of contact than non-gatekeeping enrollees. This dierence is not as striking as one would
expect, however, under such an explicit restriction: only 3 percentage points in the case
of PCP and 3 percentage points in the case of specialist visits. Also, in terms of further
utilization, gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping enrollees are very similar with the excep-
tion that gatekeeping respondents have on average more PCP visits in the course of their
treatment.
Finally, we control for the particular conditions reported, which were chosen either due
to their prevalence in the sample or due to the specic and predetermined course of treat-
ment in terms of provider choice. These conditions are hypertension, upper respiratory
infection, pregnancy, intervertebral disc dislocation, sprains and strains, wounds, other
injuries, joint disorders, connective tissue disease, skin disorders, diabetes, neoplasm, lipid
metabolism disorders, blindness, chronic pulmonary conditions, intestinal infections, and
urinary calculus. Their prevalence among gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping respondents
is summarized in Table 1.2.
Other covariates
Other covariates used in the estimation are summarized in Table 1.3. We divide them
into two categories: socio-demographic and employment-related variables.
Socio-demographic characteristics include age, sex, race, years of education at
the time of entering MEPS (top coded at 17), region of residence, urban status (whether
the person resides in a metropolitan statistical area), marital status, family size (num-
ber of children), and the natural logarithm of family income. When compared to non-
gatekeeping enrollees, gatekeeping enrollees are more likely to belong to a minority group
(hispanic, black, or Asian), have fewer years of schooling, have a higher probability of
living in a city, are less likely to be married, and have bigger families with more children.
Employment characteristics and the availability of health insurance through
an employer are interesting variables because they are assumed to be determinants of
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the choice of health plans, but should not aect gatekeeping enrollment. Employment
characteristics include number of employees at the current job location, an indicator for
being employed by a small company (1-10 employees), an indicator for rms with more
locations, and union status. Furthermore, the MEPS includes information on whether
or not the employer oers a health insurance plan, whether he provides a choice of plans
or a single option; and whether the employee eventually holds insurance through his
employer. Indeed, all these characteristics vary signicantly by gatekeeping status, with
gatekeeping enrollees having a higher probability of working in larger companies with a
choice of health plans than non-gatekeeping enrollees.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Choice of initial provider
We implement the methodology outlined in section 1.3.2 by restricting the sample
to respondents who held a health insurance policy provided by their employer, which
was the only option oered by the employer. We excluded respondents who at any time
during the reference period acquired an additional health insurance policy, either as a
policy holder (e.g. to cover special health care requirements) or as a dependent (e.g.
within family coverage).
First, we check whether the sub-sample is systematically dierent from the full sample
in terms of individual characteristics and health care utilization. In Table 1.3, panel
(2), we summarize socio-demographic and employment-related characteristics. Our sub-
sample consists of people who are slightly older and less educated than the average
respondent, with a higher proportion of males. The ethnic and regional distributions,
as well as marital status and family income are similar to the full sample. Respondents
from this sub-sample typically work in rms with fewer employees but not in the smallest
rms (with fewer than 10 employees). This nding is consistent with the observation that
medium-sized rms usually oer health insurance coverage but with a limited choice of
plans.
The main dierence in health insurance between the full sample and sub-sample is that
the sub-sample has a much lower share of gatekeeping enrollees (53 percent in the sub-
sample compared to 61 percent in the full sample). This nding suggests that when people
can choose their coverage type, they opt for a gatekeeping plan. Moreover, as shown in
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Table 1.1, panel (2), respondents in the sub-sample have lower levels of general medical
care utilization, with the exemption of primary care utilization. Summary characteristics
of the rst event within the selected medical condition shows that the ICP choice, as
well as pattern of further utilization, is similar between the full sample and sub-sample.
While in the full sample the main dierence between the gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping
enrollees is in the choice between PCPs and specialists in the sub-sample, the substitution
occurs between PCPs and non-medical personnel.
Table 1.4 summarizes results from estimating a logit for the choice of ICP within
the rst medical condition that occurred after 6 months of monitoring for both full and
sub-sample. We include two broad classes of exogenous covariates that inuence the
choice of the initial provider  condition indicators and demographic characteristics (sex,
race/ethnicity, education, region, marital status, income, number of children, and self-
perceived health status). The logit results for the full sample suggest that gatekeeping
restrictions have a positive and statistically signicant marginal eect on the probability
of contacting a PCP (3.8 percentage points) and a negative, signicant marginal eect
on the probability of contacting a specialist (3.3 percentage points). On the other hand,
estimates performed on the sub-sample indicate a weak, positive marginal eect of gate-
keeping on the probability of rst contact with a PCP (3.4 percentage points at 10 percent
signicance level), while having no statistically signicant eect on the probability of con-
tacting a specialist or any other type of providers. To put these results into perspective:
the share of patients who self-refer themselves decreased from 24 percent to 21 percent
for the full sample and remains at 22-23 percent for the subsample.
This nding is quite surprising because in most managed care settings with a gate-
keeper, a person cannot go to a specialist without a referral from the primary care physi-
cian. If they do go to a specialist, then the insurance will most probably not reimburse
the expenses. However, as the publicly available data from MEPS do not include out-of-
pocket payments of patients, it is not possible to check this implication empirically.
As for the estimated marginal eects of the other explanatory variables, condition
indicators are, in general, very good predictors of initial provider choice. Also, they are
similar both in sign and magnitude over the full sample and sub-sample. This nding is
probably due to our choice of conditions with fairly standardized courses of treatment.
Demographic characteristics, in general, do not seem to aect the probability of hospi-
talization and have a relatively low eect on the probability of a PCP visit, but they
are a signicant predictor of choosing a specialist, non-medical personnel, or ER as the
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ICP. This pattern also holds for the sub-sample, with the exemption of encounters with
specialists, where the demographic variables lose their explanatory power and choice is
primarily determined by the type of condition.
1.5.2 Course of further treatment
In this section, we explore further possible mechanisms of gatekeeping's indirect im-
pact by analyzing the eect of ICP choice on patterns of further medical care utilization.
The results of the simple model of further utilization, estimated on the full sample, are
presented in Tables 1.6 - 1.10. Tables 1.6 and 1.6 summarize the average sample prob-
abilities and numbers of encounters with a given type of provider during the episode of
care conditional on the choice of ICP and gatekeeping status. Table 1.8 then contains
the results of estimation of a logit model for the probabilities of an encounter, while
Table 1.9 contains results of estimation of a negative binomial regression model for the
number of encounters. In both tables, columns represent utilization outcomes of interest
(probability and number of encounters with a given type of provider), while rows repre-
sent the marginal eects of binary indicators of initial provider status in interaction with
the gatekeeping status of the respondent with a PCP contacted by a non-gatekeeping
enrollee being the base category. Both types of models were estimated with and without
additional covariates, corresponding to the rst and second column within each provider
category. We do not report the outcomes for other included covariates, but we comment
on their signicance in particular cases later.
The results of the estimation lead us to two basic conclusions: (1) we can observe
distinctly dierent patterns of medical care utilization conditional on the choice of ICP;
and (2) after controlling for ICP choice, gatekeeping requirements in general do not have
any additional impact on further utilization, with a few exceptions. These results hold
for both extensive and intensive utilization measures, are statistically signicant, and are
robust to the inclusion of other covariates.
More detailed analysis of utilization measures reveals other interesting patterns. PCP-
initiated episodes of care have the lowest further utilization measures both in terms of
probability and number of events. On the other hand, episodes initiated by a visit to a
specialist have a high probability of continuing treatment by the specialist and also have
an increased probability of ending in a hospital, which means that specialists see enrollees
with more serious conditions.
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Two types of patients are induced to switch from secondary to primare care by the
gatekeeping restriction. First, there are patients who do not need specialist care, and
PCPs contain costs by keeping them within primary care. Second, there are patients who
need to see a specialist for whom the initial visit to a PCP results in an immediate referral.
In comparing gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping patients, we observe that gatekeeping
patients have a signicantly higher probability of referral to a specialist.16 Thus, we
can infer that the second type of patient prevails.17 At this point, we cannot make any
inference regarding the eectiveness of gatekeeping in such a setting, however, since these
patients could be either those who would self-refer correctly and for whom the initial PCP
visit was redundant, or patients who did not know the proper specialist and beneted
from the screening provided by a PCP.
Episodes initiated by a visit to non-MD personnel have a very specic character. They
lead to a high probability of continuing treatment by non-MD personnel with multiple
visits (8 times more visits as compared to when the treatment was initiated by a PCP
visit). From the data, we indicate that these are the episodes connected to specic chronic
conditions with a standardized treatment procedure.18
If the episode starts with a hospital admission, the expected future medical care uti-
lization is on average highest among the alternatives, which suggests that hospitalization
can be used as a proxy for illness severity. Finally, emergency room visits often result in
further treatment by specialists or hospitalisation, but there is no signicant dierence
between the outcomes of gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping enrollees. Thus, we conrm
that ERs do not provide after-hours care for patients with gatekeeping insurance plans,
as is the case with uninsured patients.
Appropriateness of self-referral
Self-referral is a common path to specialist care. Based on our summary tabulations,
24 percent of non-gatekeeping and 21 percent of gatekeeping enrollees self-refer. The
eectiveness and appropriateness of self-referral depends on the patient's ability to assess
16Their probability of being referred to a specialist is 2.5 percentage points higher, which represents a
24.5 percent increase.
17This observation was conrmed by a repeated estimation on the sub-sample of respondents with
exogenous choice of health insurance, for which we did not nd signicant eect of gatekeeping on
ICP choice in the rst stage. Consistently with our inference, we also did not nd any dierence in
PCP-referral rates between gatekeeper and non-gatekeeper patients.
18Types of medical personnel contacted the most are chiropractors, nurses, technicians, physical ther-
apists and psychologists. Conditions treated by non-medical personnel include intervertebral disc dislo-
cation, connective tissue disease, and sprains and strains.
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the severity of his condition and choose an appropriate provider type. Inspired by Forrest
and Reid (1997), we try to evaluate the appropriateness by using a simple proxy for
condition severity, i.e. hospitalization.
We re-estimate the logit model for the probability of hospitalization on the sub-sample
of respondents who either have visited a PCP as the ICP and were then referred to a
specialist or who have self-referred to specialist directly. First, we examined whether
the probability of hospitalization varies by type of ICP. Our ndings are consistent with
the previous literature. In the simplest version of the model, i.e. estimation after con-
trolling for individual-specic covariates (not presented in the table), respondents who
self-referred to specialty care had a 4 percentage point lower probability of being hospital-
ized than respondents who were referred by a PCP. With a baseline hospitalization rate
of 0.073 for PCP-referred patients, this corresponds to a 55 percent lower hospitalization
rate.
Further, we add interaction terms in order to estimate separate eects for gatekeeping
and non-gatekeeping enrollees. Table 1.10 summarizes the results of estimation both on
the full sample of PCP-referred and self-referred patients, as well as exclusively on those
who were dened as having no choice of insurance plan. We see that the dierence in
hospitalization rates is based on the dierence among gatekeeping enrollees. While there
is no signicant dierence in the hospitalization rates among non-gatekeeping enrollees,
there is an almost 6 percentage point dierence between the hospitalization rate of PCP-
referred and self-referred within gatekeeping enrollees. For the sample of respondents
without insurance choice,the dierence increases to 9.4 percentage points, i.e. the chances
of hospitalization for PCP-referred patients are 3.3 times greater than for the self-referred!
1.6 Concluding Remarks
The majority of current studies on the eectiveness of managed care evaluate the role
of gatekeeping restrictions by estimating their eects on aggregate measures of health
care utilization. This approach is questionable, however, because gatekeeping is primarily
intended as a mechanism to reinforce the use of primary care physicians as initial contact
providers. Taking advantage of individual-level panel data on medical care utilization
from the 2001 - 2006 U.S. Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, we are able to isolate
multiple eects of gatekeeping restrictions, including their inuence on the choice of
initial care providers and on the course of further treatment. We explore a quasi-natural
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experiment in our data, arising from dierences in the degree of choice of insurance plans
employers oer their employees, to account for the eect of self-selection into gatekeeping
plans.
Our main results are counterintuitive and genuinely surprising. The theory behind
the concept of gatekeeping predicts fewer self-referrals to specialists and a correspond-
ing increase in the number of primary care physician (PCP) visits for individuals with
gatekeeping requirements as opposed to those enrolled in non-gatekeeper plans. Nev-
ertheless, our results show only economically trivial (although statistically signicant)
dierences. Probing more deeply, we see that most of the patients who were required
to use their primary care physicians as initial contact providers wereb referred back to
a specialist, i.e. they indeed needed specialty care. This nding, together with the fact
that within gatekeeping plans, 21 percent of patients still self-refer to specialists, implies
that the intended economic eect of gatekeeping, reducing utilization of specialty care, is
surprisingly weak.
When we assess the appropriateness of self-referrals, we nd that self-referred patients
are less severely ill than patients who were referred to specialists by primary care physi-
cians. Two mechanisms can explain these results. The rst is the behavior of patients.
While without gatekeeping restriction, patients with severe illnesses seem to distribute
themselves randomly between PCP and specialist care, they seem to behave dierently
under the gatekeeping restriction. They self-refer mainly with regular and recognizable
conditions that need specialist attention but which are only moderately severe, while with
any other condition they visit their PCP. The second mechanism is the screening role of
PCPs. As the rst-contact provider, they are retaining less sick patients in a primary
care setting while referring the more severely ill to specialty care. This tendency towards
screening is generally incentivized in gatekeeping plans (by, for example, provisions that
limit physician referral rates).
Therefore, it appears that gatekeeping operates through channels other than those
typically assumed. It does not aect direct access to specialty care as much as it changes
the composition of patients who self-refer and patients who are referred by a PCP. This
has important implications for the designers of health insurance policies as it implies
a dierentiated eect of gatekeeping restriction on the agents within a health system.
While behavior of patients seems to be only slightly modied, the incentives imposed
on gatekeeping physicians could induce a higher eciency of screening and treatment
process.
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Table 1.1: Summary of medical care utilisation measures for (1) the full sample and
(2) the sub-sample of respondents with exogenous choice of health insurance plan by
gatekeeping status
(1) Full sample (2) Sub-sample
non-gatekeeping gatekeeping non-gatekeeping gatekeeping
mean SE mean SE mean SE mean SE
General utilization
# of conditions 3.93 ∗∗ [0.04] 3.81 ∗∗ [0.03] 3.79 [0.07] 3.69 [0.07]
total # of PCP visits 3.92 [0.10] 3.92 [0.07] 4.10 [0.24] 4.12 [0.16]
total # of SPEC visits 4.83 [0.11] 4.82 [0.11] 4.40 [0.21] 4.27 [0.22]
total # of nonMD visits 7.32 ∗∗∗ [0.25] 6.24 ∗∗∗ [0.18] 6.38 [0.40] 5.82 [0.41]
total # of HOSP visits 0.24 [0.01] 0.24 [0.01] 0.19 [0.01] 0.21 [0.02]
total # of ER visits 0.45 [0.01] 0.44 [0.01] 0.39 [0.02] 0.44 [0.03]
Health indicators
healthy (0/1) b) 0.66 ∗∗∗ [0.01] 0.62 ∗∗∗ [0.01] 0.63 ∗∗∗ [0.01] 0.58 ∗∗∗ [0.01]
limitations (0/1) a) 0.07 [0.01] 0.08 [0.01] 0.07 [0.01] 0.08 [0.01]
BMI a) 27.9 [0.08] 27.8 [0.07] 28.6 [0.16] 28.2 [0.15]
smoking a) 0.20 [0.01] 0.19 [0.01] 0.21 [0.01] 0.22 [0.01]
First condition after June 1st
First encounter
PCP 0.43 ∗∗∗ [0.01] 0.46 ∗∗∗ [0.01] 0.44 ∗∗ [0.01] 0.48 ∗∗ [0.01]
specialist 0.24 ∗∗∗ [0.01] 0.21 ∗∗∗ [0.01] 0.23 [0.01] 0.22 [0.01]
nonMD 0.20 [0.01] 0.19 [0.01] 0.20 ∗∗ [0.01] 0.17 ∗∗ [0.01]
hospital 0.02 [0.01] 0.02 [0.01] 0.02 [0.01] 0.02 [0.01]
emergency 0.11 [0.01] 0.11 [0.01] 0.11 [0.01] 0.12 [0.01]
Further utilization
# of PCP visits 0.82 ∗∗ [0.02] 0.88 ∗∗ [0.02] 0.97 [0.07] 0.93 [0.06]
# of SPEC visits 1.00 [0.03] 1.00 [0.03] 0.81 ∗ [0.04] 0.91 ∗ [0.04]
# of nonMD visits 1.28 [0.07] 1.15 [0.05] 1.3 ∗∗ [0.14] 0.96 ∗∗ [0.08]
# of HOSP visits 0.07 [0.01] 0.06 [0.01] 0.06 [0.01] 0.05 [0.01]
# of ER visits 0.15 [0.01] 0.15 [0.01] 0.15 [0.01] 0.14 [0.01]
N 5203 7586 1397 1576
Note: The dierences between gate and non-gatekeeping enrollees signicant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
a) The averages made over the sub-sample of respondents that were eligible and responded to the
Self-Administered Questionnaire - approx. 87% of the sample.
b) The averages made over the sub-sample of respondents who answered the question.
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Table 1.2: Prevalence of selected health conditions by gatekeeping status
non-gatekeeping gatekeeping
Conditions mean SE mean SE t-stat
hypertension 0.03 [0.003] 0.04 [0.002] −0.57
upper resp. infection 0.07 [0.004] 0.07 [0.003] 1.30
pregnancya) 0.04 [0.004] 0.05 [0.003] −0.29
disc dislocation 0.05∗ [0.003] 0.04∗ [0.002] 1.87
sprains & strains 0.04 [0.003] 0.03 [0.002] 0.64
joint disorders 0.03 [0.002] 0.03 [0.002] −0.66
connective tissue 0.03 [0.002] 0.04 [0.002] −1.68
skin disorders 0.05 [0.003] 0.05 [0.002] 0.05
other injuries 0.02 [0.002] 0.03 [0.002] −0.94
diabetes 0.01∗ [0.001] 0.01∗ [0.001] −0.66
neoplasm 0.02∗∗∗ [0.002] 0.01∗∗∗ [0.001] 2.60
lipid metabolism 0.02 [0.002] 0.02 [0.002] 0.03
blindness 0.01 [0.002] 0.02 [0.001] −1.06
chronic pulmonary cond. 0.02 [0.002] 0.02 [0.002] 0.19
intestinal infection 0.02 [0.002] 0.02 [0.002] −1.70
urinary calculus 0.01 [0.001] 0.01 [0.001] 1.00
wounds 0.01 [0.002] 0.01 [0.001] 0.49
Note: The dierences between gate and non-gatekeeping enrollees signicant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
a) The prevalence calculated over the sub-sample of women.
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Table 1.3: Socio-demographic and employment-related characteristics of (1) the full
sample and (2) the sub-sample of respondents with exogenous choice of health insurance
plan by gatekeeping status
(1) Full sample (2) Sub-sample
non-gatekeeping gatekeeping non-gatekeeping gatekeeping
mean SE mean SE mean SE mean SE
Demography
age 41.8 [0.162] 41.9 [0.106] 43.5 [0.286] 43.7 [0.269]
male 0.44 [0.006] 0.43 [0.006] 0.51 [0.013] 0.50 [0.013]
years of education 13.68∗∗ [0.034] 13.56∗∗ [0.031] 13.32∗∗∗ [0.067] 13.03∗∗∗ [0.071]
- race/ethnicity dummies
hispanic 0.09∗∗∗ [0.004] 0.15∗∗∗ [0.004] 0.10∗∗∗ [0.008] 0.19∗∗∗ [0.010]
black 0.11∗∗∗ [0.004] 0.12∗∗∗ [0.003] 0.11 [0.008] 0.12 [0.008]
white 0.77∗∗∗ [0.006] 0.68∗∗∗ [0.005] 0.77∗∗∗ [0.011] 0.66∗∗∗ [0.012]
asian 0.03∗∗∗ [0.002] 0.04∗∗∗ [0.002] 0.02∗ [0.004] 0.03∗ [0.005]
-region dummies
northeast 0.12∗∗∗ [0.005] 0.20∗∗∗ [0.005] 0.11∗∗∗ [0.008] 0.20∗∗∗ [0.010]
midwest 0.31∗∗∗ [0.006] 0.22∗∗∗ [0.005] 0.31∗∗∗ [0.012] 0.21∗∗∗ [0.010]
south 0.40∗∗∗ [0.007] 0.33∗∗∗ [0.005] 0.45∗∗∗ [0.013] 0.37∗∗∗ [0.012]
west 0.16∗∗∗ [0.005] 0.25∗∗∗ [0.005] 0.14∗∗∗ [0.009] 0.21∗∗∗ [0.010]
urban status (0/1) 0.73∗∗∗ [0.006] 0.85∗∗∗ [0.004] 0.68∗∗∗ [0.012] 0.82∗∗∗ [0.010]
-marital status dummies
married 0.67∗∗∗ [0.006] 0.64∗∗∗ [0.006] 0.65∗∗∗ [0.013] 0.59∗∗∗ [0.012]
divorced 0.12∗∗ [0.004] 0.13 [0.004] 0.16 [0.010] 0.17 [0.010]
single 0.18 [0.005] 0.19∗∗ [0.005] 0.16∗ [0.010] 0.17 [0.010]
family size 2.87∗∗∗ [0.019] 2.95∗∗∗ [0.017] 2.82 [0.037] 2.83 [0.038]
log(income) 10.9 [0.010] 10.9 [0.007] 10.90∗ [0.017] 10.86∗ [0.015]
# of children 0.81∗∗ [0.015] 0.85∗∗ [0.013] 0.80 [0.019] 0.79 [0.028]
Employment
# of employees 168.9∗∗∗ [2.6] 186.2∗∗∗ [2.2] 157.1 [4.7] 165.1 [4.6]
small rm (0/1) 0.17∗∗∗ [0.005] 0.14∗∗∗ [0.004] 0.15∗ [0.010] 0.13∗ [0.009]
more locationsa) (0/1) 0.71∗∗ [0.006] 0.73∗∗ [0.005] 0.67 [0.013] 0.67 [0.013]
unionizeda) (0/1) 0.16 [0.005] 0.17 [0.004] 0.20 [0.011] 0.17 [0.009]
oer insurance (0/1) 0.85∗∗∗ [0.005] 0.88∗∗∗ [0.004] − − − −
choice of plans (0/1) 0.49∗∗∗ [0.008] 0.58∗∗∗ [0.006] − − − −
hold insurance (0/1) 0.75∗∗∗ [0.006] 0.78∗∗∗ [0.005] − − − −
Note: The dierences between gate and non-gatekeeping enrollees signicant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
a) The averages made over the sub-sample that responded who answered the question.
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Table 1.4: Estimation of the marginal eect of gatekeeping restriction on the probability
of the choice of the initial provider, logit on (1) the full sample and (2) the sub-sample
of respondents with exogenous choice of health insurance plan
PCP SPEC
(1) (2) (1) (2)
privGK 0.038*** [0.009] 0.034* [0.019] -0.033*** [0.008] -0.016 [0.017]
male 0.064∗∗∗ [0.009] 0.046∗∗ [0.020] −0.033∗∗∗ [0.008] −0.021 [0.017]
hispanic 0.094∗∗∗ [0.015] 0.148∗∗∗ [0.031] −0.001 [0.013] −0.047∗ [0.025]
black 0.021 [0.014] 0.058∗ [0.032] −0.000 [0.014] 0.006 [0.029]
years of educ −0.008∗∗∗ [0.002] −0.006∗ [0.004] 0.007∗∗∗ [0.002] 0.003 [0.003]
NE −0.056∗∗∗ [0.012] −0.063∗∗ [0.029] 0.086∗∗∗ [0.016] 0.051 [0.034]
MW 0.004 [0.012] −0.029 [0.028] 0.016 [0.013] −0.008 [0.028]
S 0.001 [0.012] −0.022 [0.026] 0.066∗∗∗ [0.013] 0.050∗ [0.029]
married 0.013 [0.010] 0.044∗∗ [0.022] 0.002 [0.010] −0.019 [0.020]
log(income) 0.010 [0.007] −0.006 [0.016] 0.037∗∗∗ [0.006] 0.062∗∗∗ [0.015]
# of children 0.005 [0.004] 0.012 [0.008] −0.004 [0.003] 0.001 [0.007]
healthy 0.021∗∗ [0.009] −0.004 [0.019] −0.020∗∗ [0.008] 0.005 [0.019]
neoplasm −0.116∗∗∗ [0.029] −0.065 [0.066] 0.342∗∗∗ [0.038] 0.293∗∗∗ [0.075]
diabetes 0.225∗∗∗ [0.042] 0.395∗∗∗ [0.069] −0.130∗∗∗ [0.025] −0.138∗∗∗ [0.047]
lipid metab. 0.167∗∗∗ [0.031] 0.118∗ [0.065] −0.180∗∗∗ [0.014] −0.158∗∗∗ [0.036]
blindness −0.333∗∗∗ [0.003] −0.346∗∗∗ [0.022] 0.204∗∗∗ [0.036] 0.258∗∗∗ [0.083]
hypertension 0.341∗∗∗ [0.025] 0.386∗∗∗ [0.046] −0.163∗∗∗ [0.013] −0.185∗∗∗ [0.023]
upper resp. 0.385∗∗∗ [0.018] 0.348∗∗∗ [0.036] −0.194∗∗∗ [0.007] −0.206∗∗∗ [0.013]
chron. pulm. 0.380∗∗∗ [0.031] 0.332∗∗∗ [0.059] −0.213∗∗∗ [0.010] −0.236∗∗∗ [0.014]
intestinal 0.258∗∗∗ [0.035] 0.391∗∗∗ [0.071] −0.222∗∗∗ [0.009] − −
urinary −0.163∗∗∗ [0.035] −0.204∗∗∗ [0.057] −0.125 [0.033] −0.122∗∗ [0.060]
pregnancy −0.266∗∗∗ [0.013] −0.266∗∗∗ [0.046] 0.366∗∗∗ [0.029] 0.351∗∗∗ [0.082]
disc disloc. −0.120∗∗∗ [0.016] −0.168∗∗∗ [0.031] −0.118∗∗∗ [0.013] −0.147∗∗∗ [0.023]
sprain −0.026 [0.021] −0.086∗ [0.044] −0.123∗∗∗ [0.015] −0.135∗∗∗ [0.031]
wounds −0.147∗∗∗ [0.027] −0.120∗ [0.062] −0.203∗∗∗ [0.016] −0.193∗∗∗ [0.035]
otherinj −0.088∗∗∗ [0.023] −0.119∗∗ [0.047] −0.092∗∗∗ [0.021] −0.081∗ [0.044]
joint 0.091∗∗∗ [0.026] 0.084 [0.056] −0.017 [0.022] 0.039 [0.050]
connect. tissue 0.008 [0.023] −0.056 [0.045] −0.012 [0.021] 0.045 [0.045]
skin disorder 0.028 [0.020] −0.002 [0.043] 0.145∗∗∗ [0.021] 0.113∗∗∗ [0.044]
constant 0.346∗∗∗ [0.075] 0.511∗∗ [0.169] −0.233∗∗∗ [0.064] −0.431∗∗∗ [0.148]
Wald 1123 [0] 303 [0] 1002 [0] 221 [0]
pseudo R2 0.093 0.097 0.098 0.095
N 12, 789 2, 973 12, 789 2, 927
Note: Signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard errors for coecient












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.10: Probability of hospitalisation - comparison of PCP-referred and self-referred
respondents for (1) the full sample and (2) the sub-sample of people without choice of
insurance
(1) logit + Xa) (2) logit + Xa)
PCP non-gate 0.063 0.053
SPEC non-gate -0.011 [0.018] -0.006 [0.039]
PCP gate 0.030 [0.025] 0.046 [0.065]
SPEC gate -0.024 [0.018] -0.045 [0.032]
pseudo R2 0.226 0.139
N 3,424 692
Gate only:
PCP referred - self-referred 0.052*** [0 .016] 0.094** [0.045]
pseudo R2 0.217 0.156
N 1,952 364
Note: Signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
a) Vector of covariates X consists of age, sex, ethnicity, years of education, marital status, health status dummy, and
dummies for illness types.
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Chapter 2
Demand Side Cost-Sharing and
Prescription Drugs Utilization: Evidence From
a Quasi-Natural Experiment
Eva Hromádková† and Michal Zd¥nek‡
Abstract
In this chapter we investigate the eects of introduction of lump sum copayments on
the utilization of prescription drugs by elderly patients. We make use of a unique dataset
to analyze a policy change that implemented patient cost-sharing in the Czech Republic
starting in 2008. After the introduction of copayments, the number of prescriptions lled
decreased by 29%. At the same time, however, total expenditures on prescription drugs
dropped only in the rst quarter of the postintroduction period and then returned to
previous levels. This was partially due to behavioral responses of patients and physi-
cians: a strategic shift of prescription purchases to just prior to the introduction of the
reform, prescription of more packages on one prescription and an upward shift in the
price composition of prescribed drugs.
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2.1 Introduction and Motivation
The rapid increase in utilization of health care and the corresponding rise in health ex-
penditures over recent decades concern policymakers in most developed countries (OECD
2009). In the European context, rising health expenditures have often led to adoption
of additional cost-containment strategies, mostly implemented within the framework of
reforms to existing systems of universal health coverage. While some of these measures
are aimed to regulate providers, those that target the demand (patient) side are more
often the topic of public debate. By introducing higher patient out-of-pocket payments,
policy makers aim to alter the attitudes of people towards their health, and to motivate
them to take greater personal responsibility in utilization of health care.
The ultimate success and eciency of cost-sharing measures, however, crucially de-
pends on two main factors. First, universally applied cost-containment measures dispro-
portionately aect vulnerable groups within a population (e.g. youth, elderly, chronically
ill), but it is dicult to design adjustment mechanisms for their protection. Second,
cost-sharing measures often trigger ex-ante unanticipated behavioral responses. Third,
changes in utilization patterns may bear negative consequences for long-term health out-
comes. Policy makers should be aware of these pitfalls, understand their implications,
and take them into consideration in the process of reform design.
In this paper we investigate the eects of the introduction of lump-sum copayments
on the demand for prescription drugs. We make use of the quasi-experiment of the recent
nation-wide policy change that implemented patient cost-sharing in the Czech Republic
in the form of copayments paid directly to providers/pharmacies at the point of service
starting in 2008.1 Just one year after the introduction of copayments, regional elections
led to political changes that resulted in partial reversal of the reform, as regional govern-
ments began to reimburse copayments at region-owned facilities.2 Interestingly, dierent
regions decided to implement dierent forms of reimbursement, ranging from on-the-spot
reimbursement to ex-post bank transfer. In addition, the timing of the implementation
of reimbursement diered by region. We employ this rich exogenous variation in our
analysis. The design of the policy change enables us to not only identify and quantify
changes in patient behavior after introduction of the copayment, but also to evaluate how
persistent the changes are over time. Our paper focuses on patients aged 64 and older.
1Motivation for the reform as well as details of its implementation are described in MHCR (2008).
2For details on policy change see Zd¥nek (2011)
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This is often the most vulnerable subgroup of a population, due to age-related health
issues, higher prevalence of chronic illnesses and nancial constraints due to limited job
opportunities and relatively low state pensions in the Czech Republic3.
Our results show that after the introduction of copayments, the number of prescrip-
tions lled decreased by 29%. At the same time, however, we nd that the total price of
prescription drugs purchased dropped only in the rst quarter of the post-introduction
period and then returned to previous levels and, in some cases, prices tended to increase.
We explore determinants of this seeming inconsistency and identify three important be-
havioral responses to the cost-sharing. First, we nd evidence of strategic timing behav-
ior, estimating that people stocked-up on their medications in advance by almost 50% of
the monthly pre-reform level of prescriptions. Second, since the copayment was paid on
a per prescription basis, the average number of packages per prescription increased by
14%. Finally, the price composition of drugs purchased changed as physicians started to
prescribe more expensive drugs. We show that, while the segment of cheapest prescrip-
tion drugs (less than 30 CZK per package) plummeted by 60% (23% in total price) , the
segment of high-cost drugs (more than 300 CZK per package) grew by more than 6%.
We also analyze the eects of policy reversal. We found no level response to the
start of reimbursement, however, we found an increase in the linear trend. This implies
that while the reaction to the introduction of copayments was an immediate drop in
consumption, people reacted to reimbursement by a gradual adjustment in utilisation.
The magnitude of this eect is lower compared to the introduction of reform also because
only a small subset of pharmacies owned by regional governments was reimbursing the
copayments.
To analyse the eect further, we looked into the separate reactions of dierent age
groups, nding that they were strikingly similar. The only dierence can be traced in
their further development - while younger cohorts gradually increased utilisation of drugs,
patients 80+ remained at the post-reform levels. Many patients decided to forego those
types of drugs that did not cause immediate worsening of their health (e.g. drugs for high
cholesterol or diuretics, and life style maintenance drugs like immunostimulants, products
against joint / muscle pain and analgesics). While this decision can be considered a
rational outcome of individual cost-benet analysis, long-term health eects (mainly due
3According to the OECD (2011) the ratio of average pension to average net wage is 64% (for men).
This is an average percentage among OECD countries, with Greece and Hungary having the highest and
Ireland and Mexico the lowest pensions relative to their respective average net wage.
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to decreased demand in the category of chronic treatment drugs) are yet to be determined.
In general, our study conrms that even patients from the highly sensitive subpopulation
of retired patients are willing to change their behavior in response to external stimuli,
and that these changes have predictable patterns.
2.2 Literature Review
The seminal basis for the evaluation of the eects of the patient cost-sharing on
both utilization of medical care and health outcomes is the results of the RAND Health
Insurance Experiment (summarized in Manning et al. (1987) and Newhouse (1993)).
In the late 1970s the US government funded a large scale social experiment in which
participating families were randomly assigned to plans with dierent levels of copayments
and deductibles. The main ndings that are important for our study are that (1) cost-
sharing matters and (2) the price sensitivity of drug utilization to prescription drug
copayments is fairly strong.
With expansion of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in the US and adoption
of similar cost-containment measures in the health care systems of other countries, the
literature evaluating these measures has expanded. Recently, much attention has been
given to prescription drugs.4 Goldman et al. (2004) and Landsman et al. (2005) both
look at the outcomes of natural experiments in prescription drug coverage and conrm
a signicant elasticity with respect to price. They nd that price elasticity diers with
dierent types of drugs - from low elasticity of utilization of drugs treating chronic con-
ditions (- 8% for antidepressants and - 10% for antihypersensitives) to higher elasticity of
utilization of treatments for acute diseases (-45% for anti-inammatory drugs and -44%
for antihistamines). Both of these studies, however, were conducted on on samples of
non-elderly patients.
Rice and Matsuoka (2004) review studies that focus on the elderly. Most of these
studies used cross-sectional data to identify the eect of cost-sharing either directly on
health outcomes (Kennedy and Erb 2002; Pilote et al. 2002) or on the degree of "appro-
priateness" of utilization of medical services (Tamblyn et al. 2001). Existing studies were
designed as either cross sectional or simple before-and-after comparisons and did not al-
low the researchers to control for underlying trends in the utilization of drugs. As the one
4Mainly in the context of information used to design of Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage (part
D) within the US Medicare.
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exception, Johnson et al. (1997) use the quasi-experimental design of comparing health
status indicators of HMO enrollees who experienced an increase in drug copayments with
enrollees of a dierent HMO who did not. They do not nd any signicant eect. Most
recently, Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight (2010) used a natural experiment of changes
in elderly patients' cost-sharing with variation both over time and across plans. They es-
timated the elasticities of prescription drug demand, and provide the rst sound evidence
of the existence of oset eects (specically higher hospitalization rates), mainly for the
sickest population, with chronic diseases.
The rst academic study that quantied the eects of the 2008 health care reform in
the Czech Republic was conducted by Zápal (2010). He exploits variation created by the
April 2009 legislative waiver that abolished copayments for children aged 0-18 to measure
the eect on utilization of health care. He used data on drug sales from a pharmacy as a
proxy for the number of visits to a doctor, nding no eect of the reform. He also points
out a strong strategic timing eect, with evidence suggesting that visits to a doctor were
often postponed after the start of waiver. However, his dataset consists of data from only
one Prague pharmacy and the length of the dataset is very limited. The same natural
experiment has been utilized by Votapkova and Zilova (2012), who used data from the
EU-SILC survey, to look at the change in the number of visits to a doctor in the year
after copayments for children were abolished.
One year after the introduction of copayments in 2008, the Ministry of Health of
the Czech Republic prepared a non-technical evaluation document, which was summa-
rized in the March 2009 press release (MHCR 2009). They conclude that regulatory
copayments brought yearly savings of 10 billion CZK which were used to nance the
high-cost-treatment of severely ill patients. They also report a 30% drop in the number
of (lled) prescribed items and a 21% drop in the number of purchased drug packages.
2.3 Institutional background
Prior to the reform, the Czech public health insurance system provided complete
coverage. The level of cost-sharing by patients was very low (around 10% of total health
care costs) and consisted solely of the supplementary payments for prescription drugs
(i.e. no copayments).5 Expenditures on prescription drugs and medical aids together
5Within the Czech health insurance system, part of the price for a prescription drug is paid by an
insurance company (reimbursement), and part by a patient (supplementary payments). The ratio varies
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accounted for approximately 60 billion CZK paid from the public health insurance system
per annum.6 The estimated value of unused and expired drugs was between 4-10 billion
CZK annually, i.e. 6 - 16 % of total expenditures on health care (MHCR 2008). Moreover,
the Czech Republic had the highest number of physician visits per person in the EU, at
an average of 13 visits per year (MHCR 2008). According to anecdotal evidence, some
visits to a physician were undertaken solely to obtain a prescription. The Ministry of
Health claimed that the system of drug prescription and reimbursement was inecient
and that without reform its nancing would be unsustainable in the long term.
On August 21, 2007, the Czech Parliament approved reform of the health care system
as part of its comprehensive reform of public nance. The main goal was to establish ap-
propriate incentives on both demand and supply sides of the health care market, thereby
controlling costs and enhancing the eciency of the system as a whole. To achieve this
goal, on January 1, 2008, the Ministry of Health of the Czech Republic introduced manda-
tory cost sharing in the form of lump-sum copayments for several types of health care
services including physician oce visits (30 CZK), each prescription for drugs (30 CZK),
emergency room visits (90 CZK) and each day of hospitalization / institutional care (60
CZK). The patient was obliged to pay 30 CZK for each drug prescribed, regardless of the
number of packages purchased. Prescription drugs fully paid for by the patient were not
eligible for the copayment.
The main function of the copayments was intended to be regulatory and behavioral.
Policymakers declared that the prescription copayment was intended to lower the to-
tal number of prescriptions, with particular focus on low-priced drugs also available for
the over-the-counter purchase.7 The additional resources in the system, coming either
from savings or from the copayments themselves, were supposed to be used to improve
treatment of high-severity illnesses and to nance high cost life-saving medications.
It is important to note that several other changes were made in the system of reim-
bursement of drugs from the universal health insurance. Value added tax (VAT) on drugs
increased from 5% to 9%, eective from January 1, 2008. The reimbursement amounts
from the insurance companies did not change, however, though there was a change in
the regulation of prot margins of pharmacies on the prescribed drugs. These steps have
prevented the VAT increase being directly reected in the nal price of the drug, i.e.,
with the price of the drug, with more expensive drugs being more generously reimbursed.
6The exchange rate was 24.942 CZK/EUR in 2008 and 26.445 CZK/EUR in 2009.
7Contrary to common practice in the US, some drugs can be both prescribed and sold over the counter
in the Czech Republic.
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VAT increase was mostly absorbed by the prot margins of pharmacies.
The introduction of patient cost-sharing became one of the main topics of the Oc-
tober 2008 election for regional councils, which took place in 13 of 14 regions of the
country (excluding Prague). Newly established regional governments pledged to miti-
gate the eects of health reform on citizens by reimbursing the copayments for treatment
in regional government-owned health centers/hospitals from their own regional budgets.8
With respect to copayments on prescription drugs, 12 regions (excluding Zlinsky kraj and
Prague) decided to reimburse copayments in pharmacies aliated with the hospitals and
medical centers owned by regional governments (in total 53 pharmacies of approximately
2400 in the country). Stredocesky kraj started to reimburse copayments on January 1,
2009, followed by the other 12 regions from February 2, 2009, while Prague (the largest
region) never reimbursed copayments. This has resulted in great variation in the ratio of
reimbursed copayments among the regions (for details on the reimbursement policies of
individual regions see Table 2.1).
The institutional set-up of the reform and its reversal created sucient variation to
identify the causal eect of copayments on the utilization of prescription drugs. In par-
ticular, it allows us to shed light on the behavioral responses of patients (and physicians)
to the introduction of copayments, and the eect of these responses on the eciency of
the new policies.
2.4 Data and Methodology
2.4.1 Data and sample construction
We use unique individual level panel data obtained from the major Czech public
health insurance company, which currently covers approximately 64% of the population
of the Czech Republic. The data spans 2006-2009, i.e. two years before the introduction
of copayments, one year of their existence and one year after they began to be reimbursed
in regional government-owned medical facilities.
8Dierent regions decided to implement dierent types of reimbursement. For example in Stredocesky
kraj the patient had to agree (verbally) with the reimbursement of copayment by the region, in Jihocesky
kraj the patient had to sign an agreement that he obtained a gift from the regional government, while
in Plzensky kraj the patient had to pay the copayment himself and then claim a reimbursement by
post. Some regions only reimbursed selected types of copayments - for example Zlinsky kraj reimbursed
ambulance copayments, but did not reimburse ER copayments, or copayments for prescription drugs.
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Our sample consists of a balanced panel9 of 332,724 enrollees older than 64, which
represents 5% of all enrollees of the health insurance company and 29% of its enrollees
older than 64 years of age. The insurance company that provided the data has historically
served more than 77% of the elder population of the Czech Republic. The sample was
randomly selected from all enrollees over 64. This allows us to claim that our results give
a representative picture of the drugs utilization patterns among the elderly in all regions
of the Czech Republic.
Our data provide information about all prescribed drugs, materials and medical aids
that enrollees utilized throughout the period of coverage, including drugs provided at
hospitals and physician's oces, and drugs purchased by prescription at pharmacies.
For our analysis in this paper we focus on prescription drugs collected at pharmacies,
because only these were aected by the introduction of copayments, and we disregard the
drugs provided in hospitals and during other inpatient admissions.10 Information in our
dataset includes identication of the general type of drug (the rst three digits of ATC
nomenclature11), number of packages, date of purchase, identication of the physician
who prescribed the drug, identication of the pharmacy and the nal price of the drug.
We construct four utilisation measures: (1) number of prescriptions lled at pharma-
cies, (2) total price of purchased prescription drugs12, (3) total number of packages of
prescription drugs purchased, and (4) average number of packages per prescription. We
then compute the total of each utilization measure for each cohort in each region, year
and month, separately for males and females, which yields 46,977 observations in our
nal dataset.
9Our dataset consist only of enrollees who were continuously insured by the designated health insur-
ance company for the entire 4 years. In our analysis we thus do not consider people who changed insurers
in the given time period, or who became deceased. Even though this might bias results, we argue this
would be a downward bias due to generally higher utilisation levels in the last years of life, and thus our
results provide a lower bound for the estimates.
10One could thus argue that part of the estimated eect was oset by an increase in the drugs provided
in physician's oces and hospitals. Nevertheless, this form of provision accounts for only around 9% of
all utilised drugs, the rest being prescriptions. Moreover, while the raw number of prescriptions dropped
by 29% between 2007 and 2008, the amount of drugs provided by physicians grew by only 4%, which is
less than the growth in the previous year (7%).
11The Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) Classication System is used for the classication of
drugs. It is controlled by the WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology (WHOCC).
12Regarding the total expenditure on purchased drugs, it is important to distinguish expenditures on
the price of drugs and expenditures on copayments. In our analysis, we decided to omit the latter, as
they are a simple multiplication of the number of prescriptions times 30, and their inclusion would distort
information on the change in price composition of the purchased drugs.
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2.4.2 Empirical approach
To quantify the magnitude of the causal eect of the introduction of copayments, we
estimate the specication of the form:
utilcrmy = α + β1 reformmy + β2 reversalrmy +
+ γ1 trendmy + γ2 trend_aftermy + γ3 trend_reversemy
+ δ1M(−3)my + δ2M(−2)my + δ3M(−1)my + δ4M(1)my + δ5M(2)my + δ6M(3)my
+ ρmalermy + ω1cohort+ ω2cohort
2 + θr + ϕm + ϵcrmy (2.1)
where utilrmy is selected utilization measure (in logs) for cohort c in region r, month
m and year y, and reformmy is a dummy variable indicating time after introduction of
copayments (i.e. Jan 08 - Dec 09). Variable reversalrmy is zero for the period before the
start of reimbursement, while afterwards it takes on the values of the share of copayments
that were actually reimbursed in the given region (Jan/Feb 09 - Dec 09, reimbursement
shares available in Table 2.1). Therefore, we interpret β1 as the level percentage change
in selected utilization measure after the introduction of copayments, and β2 as additional
percentage change after copayments started to be reimbursed by regional governments.
We control for a linear trend in utilisation corresponding, for example, to ageing and
increasing health care needs of our cohorts, as well as for possible changes in trends after
both introduction and reversal of the policy.
We also account for the possible strategic timing of drug purchases (stockpil-
ing). For the patients informed about the upcoming reform it would be optimal to put
pressure on their physicians in order to shift all possible prescriptions to before the start
of the reform. This would, however, imply a decrease in prescription activity in the pe-
riod immediately after the introduction. We account for this possibility by introducing
the dummy variables M(-3) - M(3) indicating separately three months before and after
copayment introduction.13 We wanted tocapture a persistent (robust) change in the uti-
lization patterns, rather than a one-time shift in the timing of prescription collection.
We also estimate an alternative specication without these controls, to demonstrate the
importance of this phenomena and its eects on the evaluation of the reform.
Other control variables included are a quadratic polynomial of cohort (age in 2006),
region and month xed eects ωc, θr and ϕm and a gender dummy. We cluster by regions,
13The three month period was chosen based on visual inspection of data.
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to allow both for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in residuals.14
We rst estimate both standard and alternative specication without stockpiling dum-
mies on the full sample. Then we use the standard specication to separately estimate
eects for dierent price categories based on price per one package. The hypothesis
is that with the increasing price of the drug the lump sum copayment represents smaller
share of the total price and thus is less eective in regulation of usage. We have divided
drugs into six categories: drugs priced 0 - 30 CZK (group of drugs targeted by the policy,
as the copayment is higher than their price), 30 - 60 CZK, 60 - 100 CZK, 100 - 300 CZK,
300 -1300 CZK and more than 1300 CZK15. By tracking changes in the price composition
of drugs, we can also detect whether the prescription behavior of physicians has changed
(e.g. whether they prescribe fewer low-cost drugs and more high-cost drugs).16
Next, we estimate the regression separately for dierent age groups of patients,
to describe how the patterns of utilisation change with rising age. We divided patients
into 5 age groups: younger than 70, 70-74, 75-79, 80-84 and 85+. While the utilisation
of prescription drugs might dier by age simply due to dierent health needs, in the
absence of income age is the best proxy for the vulnerability, due to a relatively low
level of retirement benets and absence of other sources of income among the elderly
population.
Finally, we want to assess whether the copayments aected consumption of dierent
drug categories dierently; in particular whether, in line with ndings of Landsman et al.
(2005), there was a dierent reaction with respect to acute treatment vs. chronic treat-
ment drugs. Therefore, we estimate the regression separately for each of 82 available
ATC groups (2nd level).17
14We considered using GLS to account for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, however, estimated
standard-errors were similar to the OLS estimation with clustering. Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan
(2004) explain the problems stemming from autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in dierence-in-
dierence estimates.
15Drugs costing more than 1300 CZK are the top percentile in the price distribution of drugs in 2006.
In this category, therefore, we capture the trends in prescription of high-cost drugs.
16In a system in which more expensive drugs are usually fully reimbursed, physicians may opt more
often to prescribe more expensive drugs, eectively lowering the total amount of payments that a patient
has to make (supplementary payment for the drug plus lump sum copayment).
17We have excluded groups with fewer than 50 prescriptions, eectively omitting 12 categories.
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2.5 Results
A basic description of the sample and of trends in the utilisation of prescription drugs
in the period analyzed can be found in Figure 2.1 and Table 3.2. Table 3.2 provides
additional information about the age, gender and regional composition of the sample and
summary statistics of both important utilisation measures: the number of prescriptions
and price of drugs purchased. Observed trends are in line with general intuition. There
is an increasing percentage of women in older cohorts, consistent with the higher life-
expectancy of women and thus higher probability of remaining in a balanced sample.
The share of cohort categories on the total sample population remains constant over the
years, indicating a fairly similar response of utilisation to reform. We observe substantial
variation in utilisation across regions, with Prague as an outlier with the lowest number
of prescriptions yet the highest price of drugs purchased per person. Nevertheless, at all
levels of categorisation we can observe a drop in the number of prescriptions and number
of packages after introduction of copayments.
Figure 2.1 depicts the evolution of dierent utilisation measures over time, and illus-
trates the direction and magnitude of changes after the implementation of copayments.
We observe a peak in the total number of lled prescription items one quarter before
introduction, while immediately after, these numbers dropped and remained at the lower
levels for the next two years. On the other hand, the total price of prescription drugs pur-
chased decreased only temporarily, and resumed growing at increasing rates afterwards.
There is a discontinuous jump in the average number of packages per prescription, indi-
cating that prescription of additional packages was a common behavioral response to the
reform. Finally, we nd that patients made fewer visits to pharmacies to ll prescriptions.
While there is an evident eect of the introduction of copayments, the question of
how individual copayments interacted to cause this eect remains. In our supplementary
analysis we found that the post-reform drop in the number of prescriptions (around 30%)
can be ascribed to all three levels in the prescription process. Fewer patients visited a
physician in general (-10%), and they made slightly fewer visits per person (-5%). Finally,
fewer prescriptions were written at each visit (approx - 5-10%). Comprehensive analysis
of these ndings are provided in Appendix 1.
These observations were conrmed by the results of our estimation, summarized in
Table 2.3. In panel A we show a robust 29 % level decrease in the number of pre-
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scriptions lled in the post-introduction period.18 After the start of reimbursement
we observe an increasing trend in the number of prescriptions lled, corresponding to a
gradual return of patients to their pre-reform utilisation patterns.
We would like to stress, however, the extent of the stockpiling eect and its impli-
cations for policy evaluation. Patients were well-informed about the timing of the reform
and were able to take the opportunity to save money by asking their physicians to pre-
scribe more drugs before its onset. According to our estimates, during the three months
before introduction of reform people stocked up (cumulatively) almost 50% of the pre-
reform monthly level of prescriptions, which almost perfectly corresponds to the relative
drop in the rst quarter after introduction. Comparing the results of two specications
in Table 2.3 panel A, we see that without accounting for the strategic timing we would
overestimate the overall eect by 12.5%, i.e., by more than a third of its actual value.
While the quantity of prescriptions conveys information about patients' visits to physi-
cians and changes vis-a-vis the reform, the number of packages is more indicative of
actual drug utilization. In Table 2.3 panel C we report a 13% post-introduction drop in
the number of packages purchased accompanied by signicant decrease in growth (-0.3%
a month). We detect an even higher stockpiling eect than by prescriptions, cumulatively
at 55% of pre-reform values.
Stockpiling behavior motivated us to look at the evolution of the number of pack-
ages per prescription. We inferred that as the number of prescribed packages is not
eectively limited, the rational response would be to increase it to the maximum extent
possible given the expiration date. Indeed, we nd a signicant increase in the number
of packages per prescription estimated at 16% (Table 2.3, panel D). After the start of
reimbursement we observe a trend reversal (-0.2% per month), which leads us to infer
that this behavioral response is fairly persistent over time. Estimates of the stockpiling
eect conrm our assumption that patients both stocked up on prescriptions before the
reform, and also obtained prescriptions for more packages.
Finally, we look at the total price of prescribed drugs. Estimates endorse the visual
observation from the Figure 2.1, where, after accounting for the stockpiling eect and
consequent oset in utilisation, neither reform nor reversal had a signicant level eect on
18We performed a robust check on our results using the subsample of prescriptions purchased by
patients ocially residing in dierent regions, to account for cross-region traveling after the introduction
of reimbursement. Nevertheless, results for this subsample were similar to the aggregate results and we
have not estimated a signicant change in the proportion of out-of-region clients after the reform, or its
reversal. For detailed results, please contact the authors.
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the total price of prescribed drugs. Comparing columns (1) and (2) in panel B of Table
2.3 we see that accounting for stockpiling changed the sign of the estimated eect from
a decrease (which was communicated by the Ministry in media) to an actual increase.
Furthermore, we see that after introduction of copayments the trend became signicantly
steeper (+0.5% per month), and there was no change after the start of reimbursement.
2.5.1 Price composition of purchased drugs
Growing expenditures on a decreasing number of drug packages (and even lower num-
ber of prescriptions) present an interesting paradox, which leads to speculation that the
price composition of the drugs prescribed changed. Therefore, we have categorized drugs
with respect to their unit price (per package) and estimated the eect of copayments on
each group separately. Figure 2.2 depicts the evolution of the number of prescriptions as
well as total price of these drugs over time separately for each price group, together with
the representation of the shares that each category represents. To simplify comparison,
we present variables in logarithms, normalized by the log level in January 2006, i.e., as
percentage dierences from the initial value. Results of the estimation are summarized
in Table 2.4, panels A-D.
The copayments should primarily aect prescription of cheaper drugs. Drugs priced
lower than the copayment of 30 CZK should be particularly sensitive, because the patient
would be better o to purchase them directly over-the counter. Although some lower
priced drugs that are available only by prescription (e.g. antidepressants) exist, if they
are fully paid for by the patient, the copayment does not apply. Indeed, our data conrm
that the number of packages as well as total price of this group of drugs decreased
discontinuously from the introduction of copayments. In Table 2.4, panel A we show that
the number of prescriptions dropped by 61%. The start of reimbursement then seems to
reverse the decreasing utilisation trend. 19
Contrary to aggregate results, in this group the total price persistently dropped by
almost 23% percent. This is less than the drop in the number of lled prescriptions, which
can be explained by the 24% increase in the number of packages per prescription. We can
thus conclude that for the category of drugs with a unit price under 30 CZK, the reform
19One could argue, however, that a deeper drop was expected, as prescription of this group of drugs is
irrational.We therefore performed a robustness check of this estimation using as dependent variable the
total price for the prescription (because the prescription could be still rational if more than one package
was prescribed). Results conrmed our intuition, with an estimated 88% drop.
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had the intended eect of decreasing both utilization and expenditures on drugs from
the perspective of public insurance. Nevertheless, we cannot infer anything about the
amount of drugs purchased over the counter and related expenditures.20 Moreover, even
though drugs under 30 CZK represent around 20% of all packages sold, they constitute
only 2-3% of the total price of prescription drugs purchased.
Within the category of cheaper drugs (under 300 CZK), we originally singled out drugs
with a unit price between 30 and 60 CZK, as in this category the drug price corresponds
to the copayment for prescription plus copayment for the physician visit. Yet, the results
are very similar to the categories of 60-100 and 100-300, so we will comment on them
together. We found a persistent drop in both the number of prescriptions lled (30% ,
26% and 19%, respectively) and a smaller drop in the total price (12% , 12% , and 0%).
This is, however, a much weaker response than in the category of the cheapest drugs.
Reimbursement that began in 2009 primarily aected long-term trends, indicating that
patients gradually returned to their pre-reform utilisation. In summary, in the broader
category of drugs cheaper than 300 CZK, we conrm a discontinuous drop in utilization,
consistent with the intentions of the reform. This broader category represents more than
90 % of total purchased packages, however, only 50 % of total price.21 Yet the results are
striking, because as numerous pharmecists have commented in the media, the reform did
not eectively change the total purchase price for the patient, as the 30 CZK copayment
was absorbed by the lower supplementary payment of the patient.
On the other hand, drugs with unit price higher than 300 CZK represent 50-60 %
of total price of prescription drugs, and the total number of packages purchased in this
group did not show any permanent decrease after the reform. Quite the opposite, for the
drugs priced 300-1300 CZK, we estimate a 6% increase in the number of prescriptions in
the period after reform accompanied by a signicant increase in the trend. This translates
into evolution of expenditures by 6% increase in total price after the start of reform and
an additional 10% after reversal (and a continuing increasing trend). The increasing
trend is even more pronounced in the category of drugs which represented the top 1% of
prices in 2006, i.e. more expensive than 1300 CZK. Here we nd an 18% increase in the
number of prescriptions accompanied by almost 1.5 percentage points / month increase
in the linear trend. The number of packages and total price of drugs follow very similar
patterns. In both price categories no bundling eect is present.
20These purchases are not recorded by the insurance company and therefore do not appear in our data
21After reform the ratios changed to slightly above 80 % and 40%, respectively.
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The question arises as to whether the dierence in evolution was caused by prescription
of more expensive drugs within the same line of treatment or introduction of previously
unavailable drugs. While the information about drug types is not detailed enough to
identify newer drugs, we can say that after the reform physicians started to prescribe
more expensive drugs within the same class of drugs.22In the price category of 300-1300
CZK the increase was driven mostly by drugs for treatment of cardiovascular diseases
(approx 1/3 of all prescriptions in this price range), and urological drugs23. In the highest
price category, on the other hand, the greatest increase was recorded for osteoporosis
treatment, representing approximately 75% of drugs in this category. Other growing
ATC categories included psychoanaleptics (antidepressants and anti-dementia drugs) and
diabetes treatment, but these represented only a small share of drugs within respective
ATC categories.
2.5.2 Changes in the utilisation of prescription drugs by age cat-
egory
Our analysis of drug utilisation by age categories is motivated by the dierent health
needs of individual age subgroups. Indeed, in Table 3.2 we see that patients older than 85
years ll almost 50% more prescriptions per person than patients younger than 70 years.
Interestingly, however, the total price of their drugs only amounts to 90% of the bills
of younger patients. Consequently, we ask whether these dierences also imply dierent
willingness and ability to cut down on utilisation.
General trends are illustrated in Figure 2.324 and estimation results are summarized
in Table 2.5. In general, the magnitude of the discontinuous jump in utilisation measures
after the introduction of copayments is very similar for all age groups and thus corre-
sponds to overall values  29% decrease in number of prescriptions and approximately
14% decrease in number of packages (with 14-18% increase in packages per prescription),
with no signicant change in the total price of drugs purchased. The largest dierence
can be noted for the category of people older than 85 - as they do not have a long-term
22We approximated this by the entropy of the prescription choices between dierent drug types by the
patient, and followed its mean value in time.
23Their upward trend, however, had already started in 2007 when most urological drugs were reclassi-
ed from the more expensive category due to a decrease in the pharmacy margin and, correspondingly,
the total price.
24Again, we simplify comparison by expressing the variables of interest in logs and normalizing them
by their value in January 2006
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trend of increasing utilisation (approx 0.3% per month) and after reimbursement they do
not tend to converge to the pre-reform levels, but rather stay at lower post-reform levels.
We were interested in identifying the main driver of the dierences between age cat-
egories. First, we compared the price composition of the average "drug consumption
basket" of dierent categories. However, we did not nd signicant dierences. There-
fore, we looked further into the utilisation of drugs from dierent treatment categories.
2.5.3 Eect of the reform on the utilisation of selected drug cat-
egories
We follow the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classication system which
has 14 main groups (1st level) with dierent pharmacological and therapeutic subgroups
(2nd level). While in the dataset we observe 94 categories, for estimation we omitted
12 as having too few observations. For illustration of general pattern, we have chosen
categories that had one of the ten greatest shares in total utilisation of at least one age
group in at least one year. In Table 2.6 we report the share of the given category on
the total number of prescriptions for all age groups, and their estimated change after the
introduction of copayments.
The biggest share of all utilised prescription drugs in most age categories was for
cardiovascular drugs (group C in ATC nomenclature). In terms of age structure, while
for patients under 80 years after reform utilisation of these drugs dropped (ranging from
-21% for lipid modiers to -41% for vasoprotectives), for older patients the magnitude of
the drop was only half of those numbers. We explain this by dierences in the need for
utilisation. These are maintenance drugs for treatment of chronic health conditions.
Our results indicate that at younger ages, when severe symptoms are unlikely to
be observed, patients may choose to forego their medication. This becomes less and less
sustainable at older ages, when symptoms are more likely to manifest. By way of contrast,
a good example of a chronic treatment drug where cutting down on utilisation is not an
option are drugs used to treat diabetes (A10). Indeed, in this category (see Table 2.6)
we see only a modest drop in utilisation across the age categories.
On the other hand, in Table 2.7 we report the top 10 drug categories with the greatest
utilisation drops after reform.25 In line with common intuition, these are mostly so called
25These categories were selected based on the drop estimated for the category of people younger than
70.
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"life-style maintenance" drugs, where the decision to utilize the drugs lies primarily at the
discretion of patients. Indeed, after introduction of copayments all age groups decided
to lessen use of psycholeptics, vaccines, immunostimulants, medicines treating cough and
cold, products against joint and muscular pain, and dermatological preparates.
2.6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we analyze the natural experiment of introducing small lump-sum copay-
ments for health services in the Czech Republic. Our ndings have several generalizable
implications for policy makers considering similar measures. First, we nd that patients
approach reforms with reasonable foresight and adjust their behavior to mitigate the
impact of reforms. In our example, patients not only prepare in advance by "stocking-
up" on prescriptions few months before the introduction of reforms, but also exploit the
weakness of the reform design where the fee is paid per prescription, not per package.
This implies that policy makers should: 1) carefully construct the incentive structure of
reform in the design stages (e.g. limit numbers of packages per prescription), and, 2) in
the evaluation stage, be aware of strategic timing issues that can bias initial estimates of
the eects.
While the introduction of copayments induced an almost immediate and massive re-
sponse, the estimated eects of policy reversal are relatively small. None of the utilisation
measures reacted by a level response, but rather by a trend adjustment back to the pre-
reform values. The magnitude of this eect is also much lower compared to the response
to introduction. This can be explained by the institutional set-up of reversal, when only a
small subset of pharmacies owned by regional governments (around 52 pharmacies around
the country) were eectively reimbursing the copayments.
We have also looked at whether the reform disproportionately aected the most vul-
nerable subgroups of the population, where we proxy vulnerability by age category. In
younger cohorts patients were willing to cut down on their utilisation and lowered their
demand for so called "life-maintenance" and chronic treatment drugs. On the other hand,
in older cohorts the post-reform drop was more limited, indicating that these age-groups
cannot forego treatment without severe health implications. One could therefore argue
that the reform did not have an immediate negative eect on the health of elderly, as
they have carefully considered which drugs they can and cannot aord to forego. There
are, however, also possible negative implications. First, the elderly face a higher nancial
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burden of copayments, which in their case represent a non-negligible share of monthly
expenditures (approx 4.5% based on Household Budget Survey statistics). Second, long
term health outcomes may be negatively aected by under-utilisation of chronic treatment
drugs, a consideration that can be conrmed only after the passage of time.
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Appendix A
Even after analyzing the overall eect of the reform, one important policy question
remains: Was the drop in the number of prescriptions lled the result of the copayment
for the prescription drugs, or of the introduction of copayments in general and patients
subsequently cutting down their visits to a physician?? How do these dierent types of
copayments interact?
We have attempted to partially answer this question by matching data on prescriptions
lled at pharmacies and visits to physicians. We identied the visits to physicians with
associated prescriptions by personal ID, physician ID and date of visit in relation to the
date of prescription lling (we have chosen max 15 days gap between the two, as this is
the deadline provided in the law). Three types of episodes have been identied:
1. Visits to a physician with associated prescription
2. Prescription without associated visit to a physician: most likely these represent
long-term prescriptions, as most are prescribed by the same provider and are lled
at fairly regular intervals
3. Visits to a physician without associated prescription
For type 1 and 2 episodes we look separately at how many people visited a physician's
oce or pharmacy, respectively, in a given period and how many visits per person they
made (both attributable primarily to the copayment for the visits) and how many pre-
scriptions were written or lled per visit (impact of a copayment for prescription) both
before and after introduction of copayments. For type 3 episodes we look at how the
frequency of visits changed over time.
In Figure 2.4 we present results for the visits with associated prescriptions. We can see
that there is a post-reform drop in the number of prescriptions (around 30%) which can
be ascribed to all three levels in the prescription process. Fewer patients visit physicians
in general (-10%), and they make slightly fewer visits per person (-5%). Finally, fewer
prescriptions are written at each visit (approx - 5-10%). The magnitude of change varies
signicantly for dierent age groups, with the oldest category of patients having the
greatest drop.
Results for episodes where prescriptions were lled without a previous visit to a physi-
cian (Figure 2.5) have a similar pattern, yet much greater magnitude (total drop around
40%, primarily driven by a lower number of patients making any visit to a doctor).
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Again, the dierentiation between age groups is only signicant at last level - i.e. number
of prescriptions lled per one pharmacy visit.
Interestingly, introduction of copayments did not change the patterns of the prob-
ability of at least one visit to a GP (Figure 2.6) or specialist (Figure 2.7) without an
associated prescription being written (while with GPs the pattern is an increasing trend,
in specialist visits we see seasonal uctuations around the constant). Conditional on at
least one visit, the non-prescription visits to a GP decreased consistently by 10% (without
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Table 2.7: Drug categories with greatest utilisation drop (# of packages) after intro-
duction of copayments.
ATC Description <70 70-74 75-79 80-84 85+
J07 Vaccines -0.816 -0.837 -0.810 -0.636 -0.311§
N05 Psycholeptics -0.674 -0.782 -0.808 -0.778 -0.467
M02 Topical products for
joint/muscular pain -0.635 -0.573 -0.532 -0.434 -0.224
R05 Cough and cold preparations -0.569 -0.565 -0.533 -0.413 -0.127§
D08 Disinfectants -0.444 -0.374 -0.337 -0.440 0.007§
L03 Immunostimulants -0.418 -0.279 -0.297 -0.082§ 0.172§
N02 Analgesics -0.383 -0.343 -0.311 -0.321 -0.201†
D01 Antifungals -0.369 -0.265 -0.282 -0.183 0.056‡
B01 Antithrombotic agents -0.312 -0.282 -0.272 -0.247 -0.172
H03 Thyroid therapy -0.309 -0.277 -0.314 -0.261 -0.084†
M01 Anti-inammatory and
antirheumatic products -0.265 -0.223 -0.257 -0.239 -0.129
D06 Antibiotics (dermatological) -0.252 -0.222 -0.247 -0.151 -0.022§
D07 Corticosteroids -0.225 -0.123 -0.184 -0.117† 0.020§
C05 Vasoprotectives -0.207 -0.216 -0.197 -0.224 -0.082†
Note: Categories were chosen by the drop estimated for the age category of people younger than 70.
Dependent variable is number of packages, all regressions control for county and month xed eects and
adjust for stockpiling; SE are clustered on the level of regions.
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Eect of User Fee Reimbursement: The case of
the Czech Republic
Eva Hromádková†, Franti²ek Kop°iva‡ and Michal Zd¥nek§
Abstract
In this chapter, we study the extent and determinants of the behavioral response to
cost-sharing in health care. We make use of unique patient level data that cover the intro-
duction and partial reversal of patient cost-sharing in the Czech Republic, where regional
governing bodies started to reimburse copayments for prescription drugs in the selected
(region-owned) pharmacies. We analyze how the resulting variation in the prescription
drugs' prices aected an individual's choice of pharmacy. Using both non-parametric and
parametric estimation techniques, we nd a signicant shift in patients' preferences to-
wards reimbursing pharmacies. We also identied main drivers of the shift which include
monetary cost (proxied by number of prescriptions), type of physician, and distance as a
measure of opportunity cost of time.
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3.1 Introduction and Motivation
Literature on patient cost-sharing in health care focuses primarily on its eect on uti-
lization measures, deriving implications for both nancial sustainability of the systems
as well as health status implications for patients. These aggregate eects result from
individual behavioral changes triggered by dierent aspects of cost-sharing working in-
teractively. Therefore it is dicult to predict the outcomes of particular reforms if we do
not understand all the individual incentive mechanisms at work.
In this paper, we decided to focus on one specic mechanism of behavioral response 
choice of pharmacy based on the price of a drug. We look at whether small dierences in
drug prices implied by a user fee aect a patient's preference for individual pharmacies.
Choice of pharmacy is a decision made after the visit to a physician, and as such is fairly
autonomous and not aected by other features of the health care system (such as fees
for an inpatient visit). Although it does not provide a direct measure of the utilization
change, it serves as a clear signal of how strongly even small incentives can alter patients'
behavior.
While most studies look at the eect of introduction of copayments, or explore ex-
ogenous dierences in copayments levels, we make use of a reversal of copayment policy.
In the Czech Republic, only one year after a substantial 2008 health care reform that
introduced copayments for health services, governing bodies in selected regions started to
reimburse copayments for prescriptions in the region-owned pharmacies. This situation
created a unique set-up of a reform and its subsequent partial reversal.
In this paper, we use an extensive dataset of individual physician-pharmacy visits to
identify the eect of the reimbursement. Figure 3.1 illustrates why the use of individual
data is crucial for our analysis: Looking at aggregated data (panel A) a researcher would
conclude that the start of reimbursement did not reverse the eects of introduction of
copayment. This was also the general nding regarding the eect of reversal in the
Chapter 2 of this dissertation (Hromadkova and Zdenek 2013). However, if one considers
that the reimbursement took place only in a few selected pharmacies and look at the
prescription lling at pharmacy level (panel B), the eect of reimbursement is striking,
as the number of prescriptions lled in reimbursing pharmacies almost doubled.
We estimate the eect of reimbursement both by non-parametric and parametric
methods. In the rst step, we compare patients' preferred pharmacies before and after
the start of reimbursement. We nd that in 2009 (year of reimbursement) almost 3-times
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more patients switched from a non-reimbursing to a reimbursing pharmacy. Also, the
preference for reimbursing pharmacies, measured as their ranking by number of visits,
signicantly increased, while the preference for other types of pharmacies decreased.
In the parametric estimation, we restrict our sample to the prescriptions where the
prescribing physician is located at the same building as a pharmacy, so that a patient
has a natural baseline choice for prescription lling. We estimate the probability that
a patient will visit this local pharmacy conditional on its reimbursement status and
nd a signicant 5% increase in the probability of visits at reimbursing pharmacies,
accompanied by a similar decrease at non-reimbursing pharmacies, with pharmacies in
the non-reimbursing cities serving as a control for common market trends.
For those patients who choose not to ll a prescription in the local non-reimbursing
pharmacy, we nd that the probability of choosing a (distant) reimbursing pharmacy has
almost doubled. We identied several factors that signicantly aect the magnitude of
the eect - type of prescribing physician as a proxy for the severity of illness, number of
prescriptions as a direct measure of savings from reimbursement and, nally, distance to
reimbursing pharmacy as a measure of opportunity costs of time. We believe that our
results will inform the public discussion on health care nancing and the role of patients'
incentives.
3.2 Literature review
The rst comprehensive evaluation of the relationship between the patients' cost-
sharing level, their subsequent utilisation of health care services and nal health outcomes
was performed in the mid-1970s within the framework of the RAND Health Insurance
Experiment and later summarized in Newhouse (1993). This study found a signicant
yet modest response of medical care utilization to the co-payments, in general with no
detrimental eects on health and further medical care use. The sensitivity of drug uti-
lization to prescription drug copayments, however, was fairly strong when compared to
other types of copayments.
In our study, we focus on the eect of cost-containment measures targeted at prescrip-
tion drugs. In early studies on this topic, Nelson, Reeder, and Dickson (1984) examined
the introduction of a drug copayment in South Carolina's Medicaid program. They found
that the change was associated with a statistically signicant reduction in usage of drugs
which, according to Reeder and Nelson (1985), could result in worsening of health and
69
extensive use of medical care. This eld of literature gained further attention with the
introduction of the Medicare D supplement for the prescription drug coverage. Goldman
et al. (2004) and Landsman et al. (2005) in their analysis of the natural experiments
mostly within US system, conrm a signicant elasticity with respect to price and type
of drugs, with higher elasticity of utilization of treatments for acute diseases.
Recent research has conrmed that increased cost-sharing may be associated with
osetting increases in other forms of care. Gaynor, Ho, and Town (2015) claim that after
increases in drug copayment, rises in spending on outpatient care oset 35% of the savings
from reduced prescription drug use. The eect seemed to be even more pronounced in
the population of elderly and chronically ill. Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight (2010) nd
evidence that increased prescription drug and oce visit copayments caused osetting
increases in hospitalizations in elderly patients who had been diagnosed with chronic
diseases such as diabetes, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia. Similarly, Trivedi, Moloo,
and Mor (2010) nd that increased copayments for ambulatory care for elderly patients
were associated with increased rates of hospitalizations. On the other hand, Chandra,
Gruber, and McKnight (2014) do not nd oseting eects for the sample of low-income
enrollees in the Massachusetts Commonwealth Care program.
Oset eects are a particular concern if psychological biases cause patients to overvalue
the immediate cost of a copayment relative to expected future health benets (Baicker,
Mullainathan, and Schwartzstein 2012). We believe we can measure the extent of this bias
by their reaction to the partial reversal of the nation-wide health care reform, initiated in
the Czech Republic in 2008 (MHCR 2008). Zapal (2010) and Votapkova and Zilova (2012)
analyzed the eect of the reform on t children's health care utilization of . They used
the dierence-in-dierence approach, based on the waiver that abolished co-payments of
any kind for children up to 18 years of age.
With a sample population similar to ours, Kalousova (2014) uses the Survey of Health
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) to examine the eects of copayments on
health care utilization of elderly Czechs. According to her results, the reform was as-
sociated with lower probability of primary care visit, but no change in probability of
hospitalization. Finally, Krutilová and Yaya (2012) analyze impact of this change in
out-of-pocket payments on households. Importantly for our research, they nd that the
presence of pensioners and elderly in a household was the factor which increased the over-
all burden the most and led to catastrophic payments. Thus we can identify the elderly
as a vulnerable subgroup in terms of their income with a higher probability of behavioral
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response.
Our previous paper Hromadkova and Zdenek (2013) we have identied a strong eect
of introduction of copayments on the utilisation of prescription drugs. The estimated
eect of the reversal, however, has been very small due to the aggregation of the data on
the regional level. The share of the
3.3 Institutional background
As one of the measures targeting the cost-containment, starting January 1, 2008 the
Ministry of Health of Czech Republic introduced mandatory cost sharing in the form of
copayments for all types of health care services: physician oce visits (30 CZK), item on
the prescription for drugs (30 CZK), emergency room visits (90 CZK) and each day of
hospitalization / institutional care (60 CZK). Patients paid 30 CZK for each item (type
of drug) on the prescription, regardless of the number of packages purchased. The main
function of the copayments was intended to be regulatory and behavioral. In the case
of prescription copayment, the declared intention of policymakers was to lower the total
number of prescriptions, with particular focus on low-priced drugs also available for the
over-the-counter purchase.
The introduction of patient cost sharing initiated heated public debate and became
one of the main topics of the 2008 elections to regional governments that took place in
13 out of 14 regions of the country.1 Political opposition to the incumbent government
achieved a decisive victory and newly established regional governments declared ocial
pledge to alleviate the eects of health reform on citizens by reimbursing the copayments
for treatment in municipality-owned health centers / hospitals from their own regional
budgets. The regional government in Stredocesky kraj started to reimburse the copay-
ments on January 1, 2009, followed by the other 12 regions on February 2, 2009. Prague
has never started to reimburse copayments. Dierent regions decided to implement dif-
ferent type of reimbursement, e.g. in Stredocesky kraj the verbal agreement of patients
was sucient, in Jihocesky kraj a patient must sign anagreement that he obtained "gift"
from the municipality, while in Plzensky kraj a patient had to pay the copayment himself
and then claim the reimbursement by post. Also, some regions only reimbursed selected
types of copayments. This has resulted in great variation in the ratio of reimbursed
1The exception was the capital city ofPrague, which has legal status of both a city and a region. For
historical reasons, however, only city council elections take place in Prague and these were held in 2006.
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copayments among the regions (for details on the reimbursement policies of individual
regions see Table 3.1).
With respect to copayments on the prescription drugs, most regions with the exception
of Zlinsky kraj and Prague decided to reimburse copayments in pharmacies aliated
with the region-owned hospitals or medical centers. This, however, triggered reaction
in the neighboring pharmacies, which reportedly faced plummeting demand. Eectively,
copayments were reimbursed in 50 region-owned pharmacies out of almost 2400 registered
public pharmacies in the Czech Republic, representing around 3.5% of lled prescriptions.
3.4 Data and methodology
3.4.1 Methodology
In the analysis, we focus on how the decision-making of patients with respect to lling
prescriptions changed with the introduction of copayment reimbursement. Copayments
aect all the stages of physician-patient-pharmacy interaction. First, they aect the
patient's decision to seek medical help. Second, they inuence the prescription habits of
physicians, as we have pointed out in Hromadkova and Zdenek (2013). Finally, they might
aect the patient's decision where to ll or purchase the prescription, in a situation when
some pharmacies reimburse copayments and others do not. In our study, we are eectively
focusing on the last step. In the simplied form, the decision of which pharmacy to use to
ll a prescription is a cost-minimisation in which patients weight the convenience of the
purchase (distance, ease of access, personal preferences) against the utility of purchase.
Thus, if we assume that convenience can be proxied by distance from the decision point,
the reimbursement policy will aect those at the margin between going to a more distant
pharmacy and receiving reimbursement, or going to a closer pharmacy and paying the
copayment.
We rst take a non-parametric approach to this question by looking at the changes in
the type of preferred pharmacies by reimbursement status over the time. For each patient
and each year, his preferred pharmacy is identied as the one with highest frequency of
visits.2 We restrict our analysis to those patients that live or ll their prescriptions
in towns with at least one reimbursing pharmacy (for a list, see Table 3.1). For this
subsample, we track the type of their most preferred pharmacy over time, with particular
2In case of a tie, all of pharmacies with the same number of visits have the same ranking
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focus on switching between types.
We then look at pharmacies in order to fully utilize information about the distribu-
tion of visits. Similarly to the rst step, for each patient and year we create a ranking of
pharmacies he has visited based on frequency of visits. Then, for each individual phar-
macy, we collect the rankings from all patients and identify the pharmacy's most frequent
ranking (mode of distribution of individual rankings). Finally, we calculate the mean of
these modal rankings for three groups of pharmacies by reimbursement status (pharmacy
in non-reimbursing town serving as a control, non-reimbursing pharmacy in reimbursing
town and reimbursing pharmacy) together with its standard error.
In the context of the parametrical estimation, there are several issues we had to
address when translating the theoretical concept into an empirical model. First was the
choice of the starting point - i.e. location/address where the decision about the choice
of pharmacy was made. While natural choice would be a the patient's home address,
the data does not contain that information. Therefore, we consider the address of the
prescribing physician and limit the analysis to cases when the prescription was lled the
same day, thus maximizing the probability that the patient went directly from physician
to pharmacy. The second issue is the relative dierence between distances to reimbursing
vs. non-reimbursing pharmacies (e.g. one might be located farther, but directly on the
way home). We thus decided to establish a costless baseline - look only at the subsample
of visits where physicians are located at the same address as a pharmacy.
The decision problem can then be formulated in two layers - rst is probability
of visiting local pharmacy (i.e. pharmacy located in the same building) given its
reimbursement status, second is probability of visiting a distant reimbursing pharmacy
conditional on the local pharmacy being non-reimbursing. We implement the rst stage
by estimating model using linear probability specication.3
P (GoLocal)it = F (Rt, TRi, PRi,X) + ϵit (3.1)
In the specication, we include the full set of interactions between the three main vari-
ables: Rt which has value 1 if the time of purchase t falls after the introduction of
reimbursement in given region, TRi which indicates whether the town in which patient i
lls the prescription has at least one reimbursing pharmacy, and PRi which has value 1
if the lling pharmacy reimburses copayments. We further control for patient's age and
3We have reestimated model using logit specication; results were the same.
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sex, monthly seasonality, town and drug-specic xed eects as well as the number of
prescriptions given during the visit.
Conditional on not choosing the pharmacy located in the same building as the physi-
cian and living in a city with at least one reimbursing pharmacy, a patient has a choice
to ll his prescription either at a reimbursing or non-reimbursing pharmacy. This is
formalized in the following specication using the above-dened set of variables.4
P (GoReimburse)it = G(Rt,X) + µit (3.2)
3.4.2 Data and sample construction
We use unique individual level panel data from the major Czech public insurance
company which serves approximately 64% of the Czech population. The data spans
the period 2006-2009, i.e., two years before the introduction of copayments, one year
of their existence and one year after reimbursement by the municipalities began in the
county-owned medical facilities. The basic sample consists of a balanced panel of 332,724
enrollees older than 65 years, which represents 5% of all enrollees of the health insurance
company and 29% of enrollees older than 64. The insurance company covers more than
77% of the elderly population of the Czech Republic.
Data provide information about all medical care services that were billed to the insur-
ance company, i.e. all medical care encounters (outpatient care, inpatient care, emergency
room visits and medical transfers), as well as all prescribed drugs, materials and med-
ical aids that patients utilized throughout the period of coverage. Data on prescribed
drugs include drugs provided at hospitals and physician oces, as well as drugs pur-
chased by prescription at pharmacies. For our analysis we focused on the prescription
drugs collected at the pharmacies, because only these were aected by introduction of
copayments. Information on medical care encounters includes ID and type of provider,
type of medical service provided as well as billed price. Information on prescribed drugs
includes identication of general drug type (rst three digits of ATC nomenclature5),
number of packages, date of purchase, identication of the physician that prescribed the
drug, identication of the pharmacy and billed price of the drug.
We combined data on physician visits with data on prescribed drugs into one obser-
4We have estimated both equations jointly, the results are similar.
5The Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) Classication System is used for the classication of
drugs. It is controlled by the WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology (WHOCC).
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vation based on three criteria: individual ID, physician ID, and date of physician visit /
purchase at a pharmacy. We attribute the prescription to the visit if it was lled within a
two week window after. This way, three types of visits can be identied - visits with pre-
scription, visits without prescription (check-ups) and prescriptions without visits.6 We
discarded data on visits without prescription as well as prescriptions without associated
visit. Then we merged this dataset with the secondary data source - information on all
medical care providers and pharmacies in the Czech Republic, retrieved from the pub-
licly available databases of insurance companies and the State Institute of Drug Control.7
Based on identication number, we were able to identify 78% of providers and 93% public
pharmacies representing around 88% of all considered prescriptions, and used this infor-
mation to locate the address physician oce and pharmacy. We restricted the analysis
to those cases where the pharmacy was located in a town with at least one reimbursing
pharmacy (see Table 3.1). Finally, using an automated script procedure, we retrieved
all the distances between the physician and pharmacy visited, as well as the distance
to the closest reimbursing pharmacy.8 We used this sample to run our non-parametric
estimates.
As explained in the methodological section, in the parametric estimation we focus on
the visits where (1) the physician is located in the same building (address) as a pharmacy
and (2) prescription is lled on the same day, to minimize the subjective motives for
prescription lling. This selection criterion leaves us with 30% of original number of
visits. Summary characteristics of the sample year-by-year are presented in Table 3.2.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Non-parametric estimation
In the rst step, we look at the distribution of a patient's most preferred pharmacies
by their reimbursement status in 2009, and its evolution over time. Results are sum-
marized in the Figure 3.2 panel A. In the years before the start of reimbursement the
share of patients that preferred a reimbursing pharmacy was stable at 25-26%, where
approximately 3-4% corresponded to turnover, i.e. switching preferences from reimburs-
6We assume these are long-term standing prescriptions for drugs for chronic treatment
7Contacts on all (currently) registered pharmacies can be found at:
http://www.sukl.eu/modules/apotheke/search.php
8We were using the application program interface of mapy.cz, the leading mapping server in the Czech
Republic.
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ing to non-reimbursing and vice versa. The situation changed in 2009 where the share
of people who preferred a reimbursing pharmacy jumped to 31% and the ow of people
switching from non-reimbursing to reimbursing pharmacy more than doubled, with the
reverse ow remaining at its pre-reimbursement levels. This is the rst indication that
the introduction of reimbursement aected patients' decision making regarding the choice
of pharmacy.
Further, we look closer at the individual pharmacies, track how their modal (most
frequent) ranking changed over time and whether it was related to their reimbursement
status in 2009. In Figure 3.2 panel B we present the mean of these modal rankings in time
for three groups of pharmacies by reimbursement status (pharmacy in non-reimbursing
town, non-reimbursing pharmacy in reimbursing town and reimbursing pharmacy) to-
gether with its standard error (calculated by bootstrapping). Mean modal rankings of
the three types of pharmacies are not statistically signicantly dierent from each other
except in 2009, when reimbursing pharmacies suddenly become relatively most visited
and the ranking of non-reimbursing pharmacies in reimbursing towns plummets. Modal
rankings of pharmacies in non-reimbursing towns (which can be perceived as controls)
become signicantly worse than rankings of reimbursing pharmacies, but still signicantly
better than rankings of non-reimbursing pharmacies.
3.5.2 Parametric estimation
To understand the eect of copayments reimbursement on patient behavior, we rst
look at the change of probability of lling a prescription in a pharmacy located in the same
building as the physician, conditional on whether this pharmacy reimburses copayments
or not. Figure 3.3 summarizes the result, rst presenting the aggregate share of visits
calculated directly from data, then the marginal probability resulting from estimation
of the empirical specication (3.1). Estimation conrms the story from the raw data:
After the start of reimbursement and in the towns with existing reimbursing pharmacy,
probability of lling a prescription in the local pharmacy that reimburses the prescription
copayments rose by 4.8 pp., while the probability of lling the prescription in the local
pharmacy that does not reimburse the prescription copayments dropped by 4.5 pp. In
towns without reimbursing pharmacies, the probability of lling prescription in local
pharmacy did not change signicantly. Almost 5% of patients thus responded to the
relatively small incentive of paying 30 CZK less and refrained from going to their preferred
76
pharmacy.
Building on the previous results, we were interested whether the patients did not
choose a local non-reimbursing pharmacy due to the existence of another (perhaps more
conveniently located) pharmacy or specically due to possibility of reimbursement. We
thus looked at the probability that conditional on not lling the prescription in the lo-
cal non-reimbursing pharmacy, the actual pharmacy of choice was reimbursing. Again,
as illustrated in Figure 3.4, raw data and estimates are in accordance; the estimated
probability after the start of reimbursement jumped from 10% to 19%, i.e. almost dou-
bled. This clearly indicates that the drop was primarily motivated by the reimbursement
possibility.
We also estimated the two equations together in a Heckman style MLE estimation.
While the signicance and direction of the results remained, the estimated magnitudes
were slightly smaller - approximately 4 ppt drop in the probability of going to local non-
reimbursing pharmacy and 6 ppt rise in the probability of choosing a distant reimbursing
pharmacy. 9 This was due to positive correlation between the unobservables determining
the two choices.
3.5.3 Sensitivity to selected factors
There are several factors that should aect the probability to ll a prescription in a
given pharmacy in interaction with reimbursement status. In our analysis we considered
three of them and explored, whether they have shifted preferences in a predictable direc-
tion. The results of the estimation are visualized in Figures 3.5-3.7 and summarized in
Table 3.3 (step 1 - lling locally) and 3.4 (step 2 - lling in reimbursing conditional on
not lling locally).
The rst determinant we consider is the specialty of the physician that prescribed
the drug. Our starting hypothesis is that the specialisation is positively correlated with
the severity of condition, and patients with more severe illness prefer to ll their prescrip-
tions locally regardless of the reimbursement policy of the pharmacy. Indeed, as can be
seen in Figure 3.5, change in preferences is much more pronounced for patients bringing
a prescription from their primary care physician (PCP) than for patients with a prescrip-
tion from a specialist. For the case of PCP prescriptions, there has been 9 ppt drop in
probability of lling it in non-reimbursing local pharmacies. If the local pharmacy was
9For the full results please consult the corresponding author (Eva Hromadkova).
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reimbursing, however, the probability of lling a prescription there jumped by 23 ppt.
at 75%. For the case of specialists' prescriptions, the direction of changes was the same,
yet much smaller in the magnitude. As regards step 2, after start of reimbursement,
probability of lling a prescription in a distantly located reimbursing pharmacy jumped
to approximately 19%. This is a slightly higher increase for PCP prescriptions, due to
slightly lower pre-reimbursement levels.
The second factor that we examined in detail was number of prescription lled.
As the copayment is paid on a per prescription basis, our intuition is that patients with
more prescriptions will be motivated to choose a reimbursing pharmacy due to substantial
cost-saving. Again, as illustrated in Figure 3.6 data strongly conrm the intuition: While
in the case of patients with one prescription there is almost no change in lling habits,
with an increasing number of prescriptions, the probability of them being lled in local
non-reimbursing pharmacy decreases (- 11 ppt for 5+ prescriptions) and probability of
lling in a local reimbursing pharmacy increases (+ 8.3 ppt). Interestingly, this translates
also into the step 2 decision. Although in all cases the probability of lling in a distant
reimbursing pharmacy increases signicantly after start of reimbursement, the magnitude
is 7% for patients with 1 prescription as opposed to 14% for patients with 5+ prescriptions.
Finally, the third factor we considered was distance of reimbursing pharmacy.
This serves as approximation of opportunity costs of time, when patients with a shorter
trip are expected to be more willing to switch from a local non-reimbursing pharmacy
to a distant reimbursing one. Following this logic, we have only estimated specication
(3.2). Figure 3.4 illustrates the results summarized in Table 3.4 panel C: the probability
of choosing a reimbursing pharmacy is highest if it is located at a distance smaller than
500m, which holds both for period before and after the start of reimbursement. Even
though there was almost 19 ppt increase in this distance category, we observe the highest
increase in the category of pharmacies approximately 1.5-2 km from the physician oce,
with further pharmacies having then lower and lower marginal increases in probability.
The non-linear pattern of relationship between distance and probability of visit could be
explained by several factors including the availability of public transport, or favorable
location vis-a-vis home address which is not present in our dataset.
78
3.6 Concluding Remarks
Our results contribute to the line of research focusing on the utilisation of health care
services by elderly patients. From a theoretical perspective, there are two plausible lines
of reasoning for the eect on their behavior, going in the opposite direction. First, as
these patients are older, weaker and more prone to chronic conditions, one can assume
that their patterns of utilisation are driven by habit and thus are hard to change. On the
other hand, their generally lower income and corresponding low opportunity cost of time
imply stronger impact of nancial incentives. We believe our ndings indicate that the
latter motivation prevails, as patients in our study respond quite strongly to the nancial
incentives created by the regional reimbursement policy. They shifted their preferences
toward pharmacies which reimbursed the copayments, even in the cases when they had
an outside option of visiting a conveniently located pharmacy within the same building
as prescribing physician. We believe this is a strong indication that incentives in other
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Figure 3.1: Total number of lled prescriptions (A) and average number of lled pre-
scriptions by pharmacy (B), by reimbursement status
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Figure 3.2: Patients'most preferred pharmacies (A) and modal rankings of pharmacies
(B), averaged within groups by reimbursement status and year
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Figure 3.3: Probability of lling a prescription in the local pharmacy by pharmacy type
- share calculated from data (A) and marginal probability resulting from estimation of
empirical model (B).
Note: Using sub-sample of visits where there exists a pharmacy located at the same address as physician,
















Figure 3.4: Probability of visiting distant reimbursing pharmacy conditional on not
lling a local non-reimbursing pharmacy - share calculated from data (A) and marginal
probability resulting from estimation of empirical model (B).
Note: Using sub-sample of visits where there exists a pharmacy located at the same address as physician,
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Figure 3.5: Probability of lling a prescription at the local pharmacy before and after
start of reimbursement (A) and probability of lling prescription in distant reimbursing
pharmacy, conditional on not lling it in the local non-reimbursing one (B), by pharmacy
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Figure 3.6: Marginal eect of start of reimbursement on the probability of lling a
prescription at the local pharmacy (A) and probability of lling prescription in distant
reimbursing pharmacy, conditional on not lling it in the local non-reimbursing one (B),












































Figure 3.7: Marginal eects of start of reimbursement on the probability of visiting dis-
tant reimbursing pharmacy conditional on not lling a local non-reimbursing pharmacy,































































































































































































































































































Table 3.2: Summary statistics of the sameday sample, by year
2006 2007 2008 2009
# of patients 224,687 239,343 241,045 252,397
# of visits 1,012,402 1,181,183 1,066,806 1,180,276
% of men 36.6% 36.9% 37.5% 38.6%
average age 72.7 73.6 74.4 75.2
# of prescriptions per visit 2.11 2.19 2.04 2.06
average price per prescription 380 390 500 530
share of PCP visits 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.24
Share of patients by regions (in %)
Praha 14.39 13.94 14.64 14.80
Stredocesky 8.84 8.71 8.43 8.20
Jihocesky 4.77 4.79 5.27 .38
Plzensky 5.35 5.66 5.70 6.02
Karlovarsky 3.11 3.26 3.09 2.95
Ustecky 7.88 7.82 7.53 7.152
Liberecky 3.94 3.85 3.84 3.74
Kralovehradecky 4.69 4.40 4.56 5.08
Pardubicky 5.51 5.65 5.89 5.73
Vysocina 6.75 6.78 6.91 6.88
Jihomoravsky 10.76 10.87 10.72 10.57
Olomoucky 6.64 7.02 6.71 6.96
Zlinsky 7.86 7.57 7.53 7.53
Moravskoslezsky 9.52 9.68 9.18 9.02
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Table 3.3: Eect of start of reimbursement on the probability of going lling a prescrip-
tion in the pharmacy located at the same address as provider
Before After dy/dx
coef SE coef SE coef SE
Baseline
control 0.655 0.002 0.647 0.002 -0.008 0.001
non-reimbursing 0.639 0.005 0.594 0.005 -0.045 0.002
reimbursing 0.605 0.006 0.652 0.006 0.047 0.003
A) Physician type
- PCP
control 0.695 0.003 0.681 0.003 -0.014 0.002
non-reimbursing 0.641 0.007 0.552 0.007 -0.090 0.006
reimbursing 0.517 0.013 0.746 0.016 0.226 0.017
- specialist
control 0.647 0.002 0.641 0.003 -0.007 0.001
non-reimbursing 0.639 0.005 0.603 0.006 -0.036 0.003
reimbursing 0.623 0.005 0.634 0.006 0.011 0.003
B) # of prescriptions
- 1 prescription
control 0.648 0.002 0.645 0.003 -0.004 0.001
non-reimbursing 0.629 0.005 0.604 0.006 -0.025 0.003
reimbursing 0.613 0.005 0.609 0.006 -0.003 0.003
- 2 prescriptions
control 0.665 0.003 0.655 0.003 -0.010 0.002
non-reimbursing 0.641 0.006 0.593 0.006 -0.048 0.004
reimbursing 0.62 0.006 0.644 0.006 0.024 0.004
- 3-4 prescriptions
control 0.674 0.003 0.660 0.003 -0.014 0.002
non-reimbursing 0.637 0.006 0.562 0.007 -0.076 0.005
reimbursing 0.614 0.007 0.666 0.007 0.052 0.006
- 5+ prescriptions
control 0.675 0.004 0.655 0.004 -0.019 0.003
non-reimbursing 0.637 0.008 0.527 0.009 -0.110 0.008
reimbursing 0.593 0.009 0.676 0.010 0.083 0.009
Note: Using sub-sample of visits where there exists a pharmacy located at the same address as physician,
and prescription was lled the same day as visit has been made, 4 440 667 observations.
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Table 3.4: Eect of start of reimbursement on the probability of going lling a prescrip-
tion in the pharmacy located at the same address as provider
Before After dy/dx
coef SE coef SE coef SE
Baseline 0.099 0.002 0.190 0.003 0.091 0.003
A) Physician type
- PCP 0.073 0.003 0.191 0.007 0.119 0.007
- specialist 0.104 0.002 0.189 0.003 0.085 0.004
B) # of prescriptions
- 1 prescription 0.968 0.002 0.164 0.004 0.068 0.004
- 2 prescriptions 0.104 0.003 0.192 0.005 0.089 0.005
- 3-4 prescriptions 0.098 0.003 0.230 0.006 0.132 0.007
- 5+ prescriptions 0.098 0.006 0.245 0.010 0.148 0.010
C) distance to closest
reimbursing pharmacy
<500 0.275 0.009 0.463 0.011 0.189 0.009
500-1000m 0.133 0.008 0.239 0.010 0.106 0.008
1000-1500m 0.087 0.006 0.295 0.009 0.208 0.007
1500-2000m 0.136 0.008 0.380 0.010 0.245 0.009
2000-2500m 0.150 0.006 0.328 0.010 0.177 0.009
2500-3000m 0.103 0.008 0.258 0.013 0.155 0.012
3000-5000m 0.200 0.009 0.338 0.012 0.137 0.010
>5000m 0.208 0.022 0.246 0.026 0.038 0.030
Note: Using sub-sample of visits where there exists a pharmacy located at the same address as physician,
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